

ESSAYS
COMMERCIAL and POLITICAL,
ON THE
REAL and RELATIVE INTERESTS
OF
IMPERIAL and DEPENDENT STATES,
Particularly those of
GREAT BRITAIN
AND
Her DEPENDENCIES:
Displaying the PROBABLE CAUSES of, and a Mode of
compromising the present
DISPUTES
Between this Country and her
AMERICAN COLONIES.
To which is added,
An APPENDIX,
ON THE MEANS OF
EMANCIPATING SLAVES,
Without LOSS to their
PROPRIETORS.

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P R E F A C E.

AS many publications on the *subject of the American contest* have already appeared to the world, some apology is necessary for the intrusion of any thing further : However, if *that subject* be placed in a new light, I hope it will be deemed a sufficient reason for offering this treatise to the public.

After illustrating the advantage Great Britain derived from the commerce of each Colony respectively, with the probable causes of the insurrection, and to whose charge it ought to be laid, I have endeavoured to point out the specific difference, and consequences of exercising the right of *laying on duties in general or port duties only*, and to shew that the interest of the empire requires, that our fellow-subjects in America should be *exempt from all taxation but external*, and that, in consequence of this exemption, the American Colonies be *further restrained in their navigation and fisheries than they lately were*. The regulation of the commerce of its Colonies, and right of imposing external duties, it is proved this country has, consistent with the very nature of colonization, enjoyed from the beginning : How far the exercise of those powers may render all (even the northern Colonies, who rival us in export) advantageous, is largely treated on.

The consequences to us of the independence of all, or part of our American Colonies are explained ; as likewise how deeply the other European states are interested in the event.

The necessity of, and happy consequences attending an union with Ireland ; the improvement of the revenue in Scotland, and means of increasing the fisheries of the British isles, are particularly treated of : And lastly, I have endeavoured to shew, that the British possessions in Asia, might, by proper management, be rendered far superior to all we ever held in America.

As I have, with some severity, animadverted on the Americans retaining, notwithstanding their own cry for liberty, their fellow-creatures in *perpetual slavery*, I thought it highly necessary, not only to decry this evil, but to point out a remedy, and one of such a nature, as should not clash with the interests of those whom the laws allow to oppress a part of their species; for this reason, I have added an Appendix on the Manumission of Slaves, which, without this observation, might appear foreign to the subject of this treatise—Should this mode of emancipation take place, even only in a few plantations, I shall esteem myself happy in being the fortunate means of promoting the liberty of such a part of my fellow-creatures.

I am not conscious of being prejudiced in favour of the one party or the other in the present unhappy contest with our American Colonies; at least I have endeavoured to be impartial, and believe I am actuated by a sincere love of my country, and earnest regard for the well-being of the whole empire.

I will not venture to say this treatise is free of errors, but hope that a variety of other avocations which demanded my attention will be a sufficient plea in my favour for any mistakes that may be found.

Since this book went to the press I have perused "Governor Pownall's Letter to Adam Smith, L. L. D. F. R. S. on the subject of his *Enquiry into the natural Causes of the Wealth of Nations*." Now as I have made the *free import and export of provisions* the basis of many advantages to be derived to the empire, I am sorry, that although in most other points I agree with the Governor, we should in this so widely differ.

In page 29 of the Governor's Letter we read, "You think the restraints on live cattle and corn an unreasonable and ungenerous monopoly, in that the grazing and farming business of Great Britain could be but little affected by a free importation of these, and not in the least hurt. As, on the contrary, I think, any
" change

“ change in this part of our system might be attended
 “ with the most important consequences, especially to a
 “ class of people, who bear the chief burthen of all the
 “ taxes, and are the support of the state of the commu-
 “ nity. I own I tremble for the change, and should
 “ hope this matter may be a little more thoroughly ex-
 “ plored in all the effects of its operation, before any
 “ such idea becomes a leading doctrine.”

As in the body of this work, the 4th and 9th sections especially, I have pointed out the necessities of, and advantages to be derived from *an absolute free import and export of corn, cattle, and provisions*, and have at the same time shewn that the fears of the landholders are groundless, and that, on the contrary, they in the end would be great gainers by the continuance of such free import and export, it will be here unnecessary to recapitulate all those arguments.

I shall only observe, that Governor Pownall has, in my opinion, fallen into that error long since endeavoured to be exploded, “ that the landed and commercial interests of the kingdom are different.”—On this erroneous principle he evidently prefers the landed interest to every other in the state besides, and, in this, follows a direct contrary system to that of the French, who on the other extreme of the same false principle, sacrifice the landed interest to what they think to be the commercial. They almost uniformly * prohibit the exportation of grain, that their manufacturers may never be in want of it, and always have it low. But herein (a corroboration of the landed and commercial interest being the same) they defeat the very purposes they design to promote.—The farmer in a good crop having no vend for his surplus, and fearful that the next may be as good, is anxious to dispose of what he has ;—thus more being offered at market than is wanted, occasions the whole to fall so low, that the cultivators of the earth are scarce

* In 1764 an edict was issued, permitting a free commerce in grain; but in the latter part of 1767 the export was again totally prohibited.

paid for their labour; this occasions, perhaps the next year, a neglect of a culture so disadvantageous—the crop proves short—prices rise, and they have recourse to importation: thus the landholders suffer, and the nation is drained of riches, to supply what their own soil would have afforded them; at the same time that they prevent the influx of specie that would, in consequence of a free market, have been drawn from the export of their surplus.

Although there are in every country large tracts not in culture, which would soon be under cultivation were mankind to exert their natural right of using these gifts of nature that are unoccupied or neglected by other men, we shall not contend about it, because the regulation of *civil compact* has entirely set it aside.

In this state, all that can be expected is, that those who have assumed or acquired to themselves the property of the soil, should exact no more from those who offer to labour it, or to purchase its produce, than the *real* value; that is, what in similar circumstances is practised by the landholders of the neighbouring nations: and as there would always be a competition of landholders offering to sale the use of the soil or the produce of it, they never could demand or acquire more than the natural value arising *from situation, and different numbers of inhabitants to consume it*, were the market left free and open; but when we see the landholders of any country combining to compel the people of that state to take the produce, or rent their lands at their own price—the world must allow it to be unreasonable—to be unjust—let them palliate it by what pretences they will. The reader need not be told this is the case in Britain—if he know it not, let him read the late act* boasted by the landholders, as an act of generosity and disinterestedness: I must again repeat, in restraining the free commerce of the necessaries of life, they see not their own interests.

* 13 Geo. III. Chap. 43.

Now as to the other part of the sentence quoted from the governor "that this system would be productive of "the most important consequences to a class of people "who bear the chief burthen of the taxes, and are the "support of the state of the community." If about two millions the produce of the land tax at the highest, at 4s. in the pound, be the chief part of twelve millions, the sum raised in the kingdom, the governor's assertion is true; or if he can prove that the taxes on consumption, that are paid by the landed interest, in common with the rest of the people, exceed four millions for their quota—a very probable circumstance! then we may believe that the landed interest pay the chief or principal part of the taxes.

Who ought to bear a principal portion of the taxes? They who are most interested in the population of the kingdom; and who are they but the landed interest, especially those in the interior parts of the country? For what would their lands be worth without a sale at hand for their products, too heavy to bear a charge of long transportation, and is not the principal consumption afforded by the *manufacturers* in the inland towns? Therefore an *increase*, not a *decrease* of these *consumers* is evidently their interest. The certain way to bring about the *latter*, is to overcharge those people with taxes, and by a *monopoly* to compel them to take the produce of the land at the land-worker's price. If this event is to be avoided, it follows that the *landholders* should bear a considerable portion of the taxes of the state, and allow a free commerce of the necessaries of life.

I am no advocate for the landed interest paying more than they do, but only mean to shew, that they should not, in consequence of what they do pay, imagine they have a right to make every interest in the kingdom subservient to what some of them falsely esteem their own; and for that purpose we will compare the burthens of the neighbouring nations.

In France, the landed interest, besides being distressed by the non-allowance to export their produce (wine

ex-

excepted) pay in the taille and capitation taxes a capital part of the revenue, and suffer still more by the oppressive manner in which these taxes are collected.

There the amount paid in taxes, compared to what is paid in general to the landholders, is in the proportion of 5 to 3, that is $\frac{5}{8}$ ths of the whole, or 12s. 6d. in the pound, whereas what is paid in Britain, on an average, does not exceed 2s. when the land-tax is at the highest, 4s. in the pound;—a striking difference!

In Spain, although the taxes are not esteemed high, yet in most lands * what is paid to the government exceeds what is paid to the landlord, consequently the tax, their very fertile lands excepted, is above 10s. in the pound.

Mr. Pownal says, the free import will stop improvements. On the contrary, we may expect from its consequences that it will hasten them, particularly in the interior parts of the country where they are most wanted, because the result of provisions being uniformly moderate, will be a *lowering of all wages, an extension of, or greater demand for, our manufactures and consequent increase of people*, the last of which affording consumption for every particular of the earth's produce, will occasion it to be cultivated.

Another point this author is afraid of is, that our farmers, burthen'd in war with increased taxes, will meet with a competition, of the same articles they raise, from countries less heavily taxed. It is no easy matter to find a European country where the land in proportion to its value is less heavily taxed by the government, though

* The taxes in Spain that may be accounted land-taxes, are (that part of) the MILLONES, which consist of $\frac{1}{4}$ th of the wine, besides a pecuniary tax on it; and some imposts on flesh and oils, SERVICIO AND MONTAZGO, a tax upon the flocks of sheep that come in to or go out of the pastures at the end of winter and spring; and the VALIMIENTOS, consisting of a third and a tenth of the herbage of the pastures of private persons.

DON GERONYMO DE UZTARIZ, on the Theory and Practice of Commerce and Maritime Affairs.

there may be some countries less taxed by the *land proprietors*. This competition of foreign produce (necessaries of life) is not to be feared, when we consider the vast amount of interior carriage in most of the countries exported from, the risks and damages of the sea, with expence of freight and other charges, exclusive of inland carriage at home, before it can possibly effect the inland interior consumption.

The Governor further says, *the continued influx of riches* into England for near a century past, has created a continued progressive rise in prices *which distresses the land-workers and owners*. So far from this, the landholders have been greatly benefited by this influx of riches, not only by their rents being greatly raised, but the value of their lands being improved in a yet far greater proportion, fetching now thirty years purchase or upwards, instead of ten or fifteen, in the beginning of this century. Besides, it is not the influx of money into this kingdom that has risen the prices of our own internal produce and manufactures, but the ill-judged monopoly of the produce of the earth, or necessaries of life, which, by being raised, have raised the price of labour, the principal constituent part in every manufacture, or *laboured-composite-article*, which again has operated on these very productions of the earth, so as to destroy all advantages the monopolizers proposed to themselves from the raising of them.

The influx of riches into any kingdom *where the commerce in the necessaries of life is free*, can operate no further in the advance of price *than as far as it increases the general average of the circulating mass of riches in the commercial world*. The illustration is easy. We will suppose, that in a kingdom restrained from all foreign or external commerce, the inhabitants of a particular province, had, from mines in their possession, or any peculiar cause, acquired a great influx of money, far beyond their proportion; it would, from the greater sums to spend, attract people from the other provinces; but would *this province only* experience a rise in prices,

or would it not actuate the whole provinces of the kingdom in *the direct proportion this accession of circulating riches of the one province bore to the aggregate in the whole?* And where freedom of commerce in the necessities of life is allowed, one state is to the commercial world, what, in the above instance, a province is to a kingdom.

The improvement of lands certainly requires the attention of a state as much as the improvement of its fisheries, or any other object; because, by this, as well as by the other means, the population of a state is increased, and a produce obtained, either for home consumption or foreign export.

That the lands of this kingdom are improving, every lover of his country must see with pleasure, who observes the numerous acts that are passed every session for the division of waste lands.

One general bar to improvement is, that most lands are liable to pay tithe when in grain, under which crops, during the course of their improvement, they must frequently be;—and one-tenth of the produce, where much labour and manure are expended, is in some places a heavy rent. However this is happily avoided, when before an application for an act for division a modus can be agreed on, or a certain part of the lands accepted, to exempt the remainder from all tithes.

The reader will forgive this deviation, and the extra length of the preface, when he considers that a writer of such acknowledged political abilities as Governor Pownall, differing in sentiment in a material point from the author of this treatise, rendered it highly necessary to refute, as far as in his power, these objections against his principles.

January 10, 1777.

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SECTION I.

INTRODUCTORY DISCOURSE

On the Impropriety of resisting an established Government without due Cause.

THE vindicators of the Americans, in their present resistance against their Parent-State, have laid great stress on the *right of the People* to alter and remodel their Government whenever they please.

As I allow there is no *power held by divine right*, I agree with them in their assertion; if by the *people* be meant the majority of an empire, not that of a province only; for then, in the latter case, the county of York would have a right to alter its constitution; so would Devonshire, &c. By and by the people of one riding or division of Yorkshire, might take it into their heads to make a farther alteration, till in the end we should have as many constitutions as parishes, and then have them all once more remodelled, and again reunited under some new form, by their becoming a province of some Power, that knew and practised the art of governing better.

A province of an empire may nevertheless, if labouring under particular oppression, be justified in taking up arms in defence of their liberties, although they have no right to do it

in trivial causes, nor for the avowed purpose of changing their form of government.

What I shall now endeavour to prove is, That no Governing Power, whether an Aristocracy, a Democracy, a limited, or even an absolute Monarchy ought, without great occasion, to be resisted; and further, That the Americans have had no such cause to justify their rising in Arms.

The end of all good government is to prevent the strong from oppressing the weak, the lawless from committing depredations on the peaceful and industrious; and by securing personal freedom and private property, to promote industry the great source of riches and collective strength, that the community, so combined, may not only keep peace and good order among themselves, but be able to repel the hostile invasions of any other community, or body of people, that may endeavour to disturb their tranquillity and repose.

As it is obvious the whole body of the people cannot be engaged in legislation and the executive part of government, it follows, that these powers must be entrusted in the hands of a certain number of the community, which will be more or less according to the form of their government. Now let the form of the constitution be ever so good, those who actually possess the ruling power will have passions like other men, and consequently be liable to err; but it does not follow, that for every error of government, which they might probably

bably correct of themselves, the people, who think they are, or are in reality in some measure, aggrieved, should rise in arms and oppose them; for this would eternally be productive of bloodshed, anarchy and disorder, and so far weaken the community, that they would become an easy prey to the ambitious views of any neighbouring power.—They would then lose the substance of liberty, by grasping at its shadow: Even supposing them successful, all they can do is to trust the power in the hands of other men, who, as men, either through depravity of mind or want of judgment, will be as liable to err as the former. They will then, *if they have been contending without sufficient cause*, after having exhausted much blood and treasure, and brought ruin upon many who would otherwise have been in happier circumstances, have the same to contend for over again, or quietly sit down with these additional aggravations of misery, which they have brought upon themselves.

As all governing powers are liable to err and encroach on the liberty of the subject, so are they likewise capable of reforming when they have seen into the false policy of what they have done. This event ought to be expected with some degree of patience, or resistance is criminal because *productive of greater evils than those it endeavours to redress*.

I by no means intend to infer that the governing powers should never be resisted,

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for, as a Briton, I glory in the noble and successful resistance our ancestors made to the arbitrary power of Charles I. I only wish to point out a medium between absolute obedience or non-resistance, and rising in arms without duly considering whether the cause, *in its ill effects to them and their posterity*, be equal to the immediate carnage and ruin infallibly attendant on civil war.

Civil wars, even in a just cause, too frequently end where they began; for by the continuance of them the people become tired of their consequent anarchy and distress, and contrasting their then unsettled state with peace at home, and their former, though perhaps very indifferent government, are glad to have any government at all; thus it returns into its old channel; while the advantage and opportunity of remodelling the state and obviating the defects of the old constitution, are entirely, or in a great measure lost in the general desire of quiet and repose, after such scenes of turbulence and bloodshed.—Witness most of the revolutions in this Kingdom and in almost every other state.

Before I enter into the merits of the present unhappy contest, it will be necessary to consider the connection there is between a Parent-state and its Colonies, with the natural claims of the former, which when discussed the other will follow of course.

S E C T I O N II.

Motives of Colonization and comparative advantages to Great Britain, from her different Continental Colonies, in North America.

A LATE writer in a sensible treatise* on the importance of the American Colonies to Britain, observes very justly, "there are three grand reasons for a country's planting colonies."

1. "Affording a national retreat to such persons as will emigrate."
2. "Affording a retreat to the emigrants of foreign countries."
3. "Raising the productions of climates different from their own, and thereby saving the purchase of such."

If we enquire how far our Colonies in America have answered these ends, we shall find some of them have done it in a greater degree than others.

The Northern Colonies, we know, in the time of Charles the first in particular, were resorted to, and peopled by great numbers of emigrants from this kingdom, who, had it not been for our possession of, or claim to those provinces, would have been absolutely lost to this country, and consequently its power diminished in the proportion these emi-

* Latter part of 2d. vol. of American Husbandry.

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grants bore to the whole number of the people; at the same time, that some other powers, perhaps our rivals, had been reaping a proportionate accession of strength. Thus far the first motive of acquiring new settlements has been answered.

The second is of a similar nature, as the receiving under our government, emigrants from foreign countries, not only strengthens ourselves, but weakens those they have come from. This advantage we have likewise reaped from our American settlements, for besides the Swedes and Dutch, that were left in the Colonies of New Jersey and New York,* when those powers gave up their claim to these Colonies, immense numbers of Germans and other foreigners have resorted thither from Europe.

The third end of colonizing, viz. "raising productions the mother-country cannot." It is plain it cannot be answered by the New England Colonies, as their climate is similar to our own, unless they produced some minerals the mother-country does not, which in some of them is not the case. From their cli-

* The province of New York, called by the Dutch New Holland, or New Netherlands, was conquered from that power in the latter end of the year 1664. The Dutch recovered it in 1672, but restored it a few months after by the treaty of peace. At the time of this conquest, New Jersey was entirely under the dominion of the Dutch, they having long settled the north eastern parts, as a part of New Holland, and a little before the period above-mentioned, bought the remainder of Rizing, the Swedish General.

TABLE of the POPULATION, IMPORTS, EXPORTS

Provinces.	No. of Inhabitants, white and black.	British Ships employ'd	No. of Seamen	Value of Imports from Great Britain.
Canada — — —	120,000	34	408	105,000
Labrador — — —	40,000	6	72	*
Nova Scotia and Northern Islands	280,000			26,500
New England { Massachusetts Bay New Hampshire Connecticut Rhode Island	80,000 180,000 60,000	49	588	407,000
New York — — —	100,000	30	330	531,000
East and West Jersey —	80,000			1,142,000
Pennsylvania with lower Counties on Delaware }	400,000	35	390	611,000
Virginia and Maryland —	720,000	330	3,960	865,000
North Carolina — —	120,000	34	408	18,000
South Carolina — —	180,000	140	1,680	365,000
Georgia § — — —	30,000	24	240	49,000
East Florida § — —	4,000	2	24	7,000
West Florida § — —	6,000	10	120	97,000
	2,400,000	694	8,220	3,081,500

N. B. The articles of export follow each other in the same succession as the value of their respective range with the others according to their collective value.

* No regular exports to Labrador, as we have no fixed settlements except in the southern parts, the exports to which are every season, viz. principally from New England. One hundred and twenty sail of American vessels are employed.

† From New London and other places in Connecticut they have lately shipped off large quantities of wheat, but principally from New York.

‡ At the time these estimates were made, the export from East Florida, in indigo and peltry, might be about 5 or 6 millions of dollars; but they had likewise begun to cut large quantities of lumber, viz. slaves, shingles, pine scantlings, &c.

§ The number of the inhabitants in Georgia, and each of the Floridas respectively, is estimated by the author, as the best estimate.

¶ Fur and peltry—Deer skins and peltry—may by some be deemed an impropriety, as both furs and deer skins come from the same country.

PORTS, &c. of the British-American Continental Colonies.

Value of Exports.	Different Articles exported to Great Britain, Europe, the West Indies, &c.
105,500	Peltry, wheat, lumber, whalebone, fish oil, &c. — — N. B. Value of peltry £. 76,000
49,050	Fish oil, whalebone, and seal skins
38,000	Fish, fish oil, lumber, and whalebone — — — N. B. Produce of fisheries £. 34,000
485,000	{ Fish oil, fish, lumber, ships, pot-ash, live stock, salt provisions, &c. &c.† N. B. Produce of fisheries £. 250,000
526,000	{ Flour and biscuit, wheat and other grain, deer skins and peltry, salt provisions, lumber, copper ore and iron in pigs and bars, live stock, flax seed, pot-ash, ships, &c. N. B. Amount of flour and provisions £. 386,000
	† Both the imports and exports of New Jersey are included in those of New York and Pennsylvania.
705,500	{ Flour, wheat and other grain, salt provisions, deer skins and peltry, lumber, copper ore and iron in pigs and bars, flax seed, live stock, ships, &c. — N. B. Amount of flour and provisions £. 517,000
1,040,000	{ Tobacco, wheat and other grain, lumber, iron in pigs and bars, ships, deer skins and peltry, hemp, salt provisions, flax seed, &c. — — N. B. Value of tobacco £. 768,000
68,350	{ Tar, pitch and turpentine, lumber, tobacco, Indian corn and other grain, deer skins and peltry, live stock and rice. — — — N. B. Tar, pitch, and turpentine £. 17,850
395,666	{ Rice, indigo, deer skins and peltry, salt provisions, live stock, Indian corn and other grain, ships, &c. — — — N. B. Rice £. 220,000
74,200	{ Rice, deer skins and peltry, live stock, drugs, silk, indigo, &c. — N. B. Value of rice £. 36,000
63,000	† Deer skins and peltry, logwood and other dying woods, and silver in dollars.
3,550,266	

respective amounts, beginning with the greatest first: And where two or more articles are joined together, they

which are included in those to Canada. The consumption of the fishermen and traders is supplied from the place they come from

principally by the way of New York, by which channel a considerable part of their other produce is exported.

6000l. annually. Since that period some considerable rice plantations have been set forward on St. John's and St. Mary's rivers; and

the aggregate was only given, in the account the above is copied from.

come under the general name of peltry: They are however mentioned separately, as essentially differing in value.

mate being the same, it follows, that the inhabitants must principally apply themselves to the same employments as their fellow-subjects in Britain, that is raising corn and provisions, and exporting their superfluity, in which, as well as in the fisheries, they rival Great Britain and Ireland, and without restraint, as their principal products are not among the enumerated articles;* and now, as they are, in many places collected in towns, and become so populous, as to have hands to spare from agriculture, they in a great measure raise many of the manufactures they consume: whereas, the supplying of them with ours, was the principal advantage we reaped from them, and the only one wherein they could be said to administer to the taxes paid for the support of the empire.

How far they do this, will appear from the following table of the population of the Colonies, and value of British exports to each; with the exports from each Colony, and number of British ships and seamen employed.

* Sugar, tobacco, cotton-wool, indigo, ginger, fustick, or other dying wood, rice, molasses, hemp, copper-ore, beaver-skins, or other furs, pitch, tar, turpentine, masts, yards, and bowsprits of the growth, production, or manufacture of any of the British plantations in America, Asia, or Africa, are articles *enumerated* by 12 Car. II. chap. 18, 22, and 23. Car. II. chap. 26, 25. Car. II. chap. 7, 3 and 4 Ann, chap. 5 and 10, 12 Ann, chap. 9, &c. &c. all which articles (except rice and sugar under certain limitations) cannot be carried from any of the said places, unless to some other *British plantations*, or to the kingdom of Great Britain.

The

8 S E C T I O N II.

The fore part of the foregoing table, as far as relates to the population of the Provinces, is taken from an account published in New Jerfey in Nov. 1765, and that part which relates to the number of British fhips and feamen employed in the commerce of each colony, and the amount, &c. of the exports and imports, is extracted from the American Traveller, published in 1769. The imports and exports are at a medium of three years, and I believe pretty accurate for that time.

As the number of inhabitants in New England were 600,000, and the British exports thither £.407,000, it follows, that each individual took from Britain thirteen fhillings and fix-pence nearly.—To view this in the moft favourable light, we will fuppofe thofe articles * and manufactures were made entirely of British raw materials, and confequently the value of them derived folely from the labour employed in raifing the raw materials, and compleating from them the manufactures (including the profit of thofe through whose different hands the materials, both before and after manufacturing pafs).—Now, if we rate the annual labour of a manufacturer (manufacturers, their wives and children at an ave-

* Coarfe German linens form a confiderable part of our exports, likewise India goods and other articles that our manufactures have nothing to do with. Of thefe warehoufe rent, portorage, the profit of our merchants, and the fmall difference between duty and draw-back are the advantages we reap.

rage) at £. 13 10 *, it follows, that *twenty New England colonists*, paying 13s. 6d. each for British labour, only employ one individual; and supposing this person without that employ must otherwise have emigrated, they then *only pay the taxes of one British resident*, and this, one of the lower class of the people. As it is therefore plain they only pay each individual, rich and poor on an average, one-twentieth part of what a labouring person does in Britain, towards the government, fleet, and armies, which protect *them* equally with *ourselves*, it becomes matter of enquiry what benefit this kingdom reaps from these Colonies that entitles them to be so much more favoured than their fellow-subjects in the Mother-country. It naturally occurs—Are they not restrained in their commerce? No! they enjoy every advantage with those who pay more than twenty times their taxes. Thus eased of burthen, they rival them in every respect. They carry their corn and other produce to foreign markets, where they meet the productions of Britain, and occasion them to lay on hand by underfelling them. They likewise run away with the principal share of that great source of British wealth and naval power, *the Fishery of Newfoundland*.

All the reason that can be given for this partiality is, that none would emigrate from

* Able men in most manufactures, earn at least 10s. per week, £. 26 yearly, and children from 3s. to 7, viz. £. 7. 16. to £. 18. 4.

their native country without some view of advantage, and that they maintain their own civil establishment—A burthen not so great as that of many corporate towns in Britain, who maintain, or give salaries to their Mayors, Recorders, &c.

Can it be the interest of Britain to support Colonies that reap every essential advantage of commerce with herself, and at the same time exempt them from all authority or allegiance but what they please to admit? It certainly cannot, for then they would, to all intents and purposes, be more detrimental than if they were independent states.

Holland, Hamburgh, Bremen, &c. to which places our exports are more considerable, even in proportion to their population, might with the same reason expect to share all the advantages of British subjects in the British dominions, and that we should pay the expence of maintaining the fleets and armies that might be found necessary to protect them.

Let us now advert to our other American Colonies, and we shall find as they advance towards the sun, they are the more beneficial to Britain, as, from their difference in climate, they produce staple commodities that this island cannot, and enable us, not only to supply our own necessities, by an exchange of our manufactures, but likewise, for the same exchange, afford us a superfluity of those staples (rice and tobacco in particular) which
we

we exchange with other nations, in a great measure for bullion, or at least for such necessities as we should otherwise have to send so much bullion out of the kingdom for.

A further advantage attending these Southern Colonies is, that while they are employed in raising those great staples of agriculture, so advantageous both to us and them, they do not manufacture for themselves, neither do they interfere with the Mother-country, in the carrying trade nor the fisheries. The reason is obvious, they find agriculture more advantageous than either.

The imports to New York and Philadelphia, from Britain, are almost equal to 40s.* for each individual in the provinces of New York, Jersey and Philadelphia; a greater proportion than even any of the southern Colony imports, West Florida excepted.

Excepting peltry, copper-ore, iron, flax-seed, and pot-ash, these provinces do not raise any staple of moment valuable to Britain: and as two-thirds of the value of their exports are in flour, grain, and provisions, it must be admitted, they in some measure rival Great Britain and Ireland, but when we consider the greater part of these return to Britain, to employ our manufacturers, and purchase articles we have imported, we have the less reason to complain, although it would be

* This and the following sums in this section, are calculated from the data, in the table of exports and are all sterling.

more advantageous, were their industry turned into another channel, or their export of provisions properly regulated. However, as exports of grain from Britain, are not now to be expected annually, and were this kingdom and Ireland fully peopled, all the grain and provisions raised, would in general be consumed at home; the export of grain from our Colonies, unrestrained as it now is, is not of so evil a consequence to this kingdom, as the interference of these (and the New England) Colonies with us in the fisheries, which will be particularly treated of in a future section.

Virginia and Maryland, for each inhabitant* take from Britain, about 24s. the Carolinas 25s. 6d. Georgia 32s. 8d. East Florida 35s. and West Florida £. 16 . 3 . 4. The British articles sent to the coast of Guinea, to purchase the slaves imported into these Colonies, will considerably increase those sums.

And besides (as we have observed before) the great advantage we make by their staples, and non-interference in the carrying trade and fisheries, unite to make those Colonies of the greatest consequence to Britain.

The vast amount of the West Floridan import (£. 16 . 3 . 4) for every individual of its population, is owing to the conveniency of its situation for trade with the Indians for furs; and with the Spaniards, from whom, in exchange for British commodities, they receive

* The Indians are not included.

dying woods, indigo and dollars, all which prove the great importance of this province and of that trade, which the administration of Grenville was so impolitic, as to endeavour to put a stop to.—The great excess of the West Floridan imports above their exports is what must happen in all new settlements, and was occasioned by the stocks of goods required to carry on the Spanish and Indian trades, and the capitals necessary to improve their lands, which they have begun to cultivate in the west parts of the province.

The imports and exports both of Canada and the adjoining part of Labrador (the only part that is inhabited, except by Indians) are included under those of Canada. They do not, according to our data, take from Britain more than the value of 17s. 6d. for each inhabitant, consequently this Colony has the appearance of being little profitable; but when we consider the principal part of their export consists in an advantageous staple, peltry, it is not, though far north, without its use to this country*.

* Nova-Scotia, and the isles of Cape Breton, St. John's, &c. take but at the rate of 13s. 3d. for each individual of their inhabitants; notwithstanding this they would be va-

* Canada, since that time, has increased greatly in the exportation of grain, so that in the year 1773 they were able to export 50,000 quarters of wheat, and in 1774 or 1775, near double that quantity.

luable Colonies, as near nine-tenths of their exports are the produce of the fisheries *on their own coasts*, were the carriage of this produce to market to be solely in British ships.

More than half the export of the New England Colonies is the produce of their fisheries, but the reason why disadvantageous to us is, this produce is that of fisheries distant from them, which the Parent-state might carry on to advantage. As to the fisheries *on their own coast* they are the best situated to carry them on, and it would be unreasonable, as well as impolitic, to prevent them.

It would be equally so, not to suffer them to carry on the whale or other fisheries wherein every other power has a right to fish as well as ourselves. All is, they should be confined to these, and then, if we have the carriage of their produce to market, neither party can have just reason to complain.

S E C T I O N III.

On the principles of policy, that ought to subsist between a parent state and her Colonies, consistent with the reciprocal interests of both.

IT cannot be supposed, that any country would colonize or send, protect and support people in distant countries, for a great length of time, and at a vast expence, if it was expected these colonies would, as soon as opportunity offered, and they could do without the parent-country's protection, repay all her kindness by looking on themselves as an *original* and independent people—Nor should it be imagined, that the legislature of the Mother-country, should have an uncontrollable, unlimited power, over the property of the colonists. The line certainly should, and may be drawn so, as to be advantageous to, and answer what ought to be the real interests of both.

“ The Mother-country, in recompence of
 “ founding, supporting, and giving protection
 “ to the Colonies, should be intitled to carry
 “ on solely in her own ships*, all their trade
 “ to

* Since writing this section, have accidentally turned upon a part of Postlethwaite's Commercial System of Great Britain, wherein I find his sentiments on Colony Navigation are similar to what I have wrote; and as he is a writer of acknowledged-

“to and from Europe*, and even all parts
 “of the world, their own and adjoining
 “coasts and islands excepted—And to re-
 “gulate their commerce, so as to make it
 “coincide with her own interests.

“The

knowledge of political merit, I shall, for the satisfaction of the reader, give them in his own words, viz.

After laying down the causes of colonization, he says, “From these principles it follows, that Colonies are designed for culture only, and that the navigation occasioned by that culture belongs to the seamen of the Mother-country. “This maxim cannot be controverted; and it would be better to enforce it with rigour, than suffer it to be too much deviated from by over great lenity, or any other means.”

The same author observes, that “the first kind of navigation useful, and even necessary to colonies, is their coasting trade.” And further says, “Another branch of navigation useful to them, is that which they carry on with other Colonies, to supply them only with commodities of the product of the Mother-country, or of their own growth, not admitted by their Mother-country at home, though allowed in the Colonies for prudential reasons.”

* This is nothing more than a power we have already exercised with our American Colonies, for by the 3 Geo. II. chap. 28, and 27 Geo. II. chap. 18, admitting rice to be carried direct from Carolina or Georgia to any part of Europe south of Cape Finisterre, it is enacted that it shall be only in ships built in Great Britain, and *belonging to British subjects residing in Great Britain*, and legally navigated. And by the 12 Geo. II. chap. 30, and 24 Geo. II. chap. 57, sugars of the growth, produce, or manufacture of the plantations may there be shipped for any foreign part of Europe, provided it be in vessels built in Great Britain, and *belonging to subjects residing in Great Britain*, or the *major part of them* residing in Great Britain, and the residue in some of the British sugar colonies in America. Likewise the ships loading rice or sugar, even under these regulations, are obliged to proceed to Great Britain before they return to the British plantations.

“The Colonies in return for this restraint on their navigation and trade, should be exempted from all internal taxes whatever, for the support of the empire.” They would therefore have nothing to maintain but their own civil power, which would be a very trivial burthen.

“And lastly, their Legislation should be in every respect equally free and similar to that of the Mother-country, and their governors appointed from thence.”

Before we enter into the particular merits and consequences of these regulations, let us see whether the Colonies could have any just reason to complain.—Let us imagine ourselves under the same predicament.

Suppose Britain dependent on France, and she to make the following offer to us :

“You may either enjoy all the privileges we do as French subjects and residents, provided that, equally with us, you pay all taxes and burthens of the state ; or otherwise you may be exempt from all internal taxes, except the maintenance of your own civil power, leaving to us the entire regu-

In this instance Dean Tucker has made a mistake in asserting, “that all the coasts of the Mediterranean and the south of Europe are already supplied with rice from the Colonies, in the same manner as if there had been an actual separation ; no rice-ship bound to any place south of Cape Finisterre being at all obliged to touch at any part of Great Britain.” See his *True Interest of Great Britain in regard to the Colonies*. The last of his *Four Tracts on Political and Commercial Subjects*.

D

“lation

“lation of your trade, and to be your sole
“carriers by sea, your coasting trade excepted.”

Britain, so far from losing by the latter choice, would, in my opinion, evidently gain.

Doctor Price, in the appendix to his Observations on Civil Liberty, has estimated the whole drawn from the public in taxes and customs, with the charges of collecting them at £. 12,000,000. Of this sum the customs of England and Scotland (with charges of collection and different bounties, which are part of their produce) are only about £. 3,100,000. Now supposing we set aside a further sum of £. 400,000, for the annual support of the governor (or viceroy) and the civil power, there will still remain an exemption from the payment of eight millions and a half, a sum infinitely greater than could possibly be gained by all the shipping of the kingdom, perhaps more than the whole freight of its commerce.

From these premises it will admit of no dispute, that were the Colonies excluded from all foreign navigation, and at the same time exempted from internal taxation, the colonists, as individuals, would enjoy greater advantages than the residents in Britain, even supposing their external taxes were as high as they are now in this kingdom, and they were further deprived of carrying on their coasting trade in their own ships.

The Colonies south of Pennsylvania have very little shipping, so can feel no inconvenience

nience from the proposed restriction, as they already employ British ships, or those of their neighbours, the northern Colonies.

The proprietors of ships in the northern Colonies, from the great number they possess and employ, not only in their own immediate commerce, but even in that of the Colonies to the south, would be the only body of people who could have any shadow of reason to complain, were the proposed restraining law put immediately in force; but by suspending it for one or two years, these people would have time sufficient to obviate any inconvenience thence arising to themselves, by disposing of their shipping to the residents of Britain (who would have a great demand for ships from their increase of carrying trade) or otherwise, by becoming residents in Britain, they might continue their property in ships, and the employ of them unchanged.

This alternative, mild and easy as it is, would undoubtedly be complained of as an infringement of natural liberty; but even supposing it a hardship, it is necessary the interest of individuals should give way to the good of the public.

If it be essential that all the shipping employed in the Colony foreign trade should be British property, it is equally, or even more so that they should be navigated by British denizens or residents, that is (according to the act of navigation in other cases) the master and two-thirds of the crew should be British.

As failors are a class of men that will not readily betake themselves to any other employment, it would be highly necessary to provide for those Americans who are already of that profession, and at the same time put a stop to their farther increase.

Both these ends, I am of opinion, would be answered, by allowing all American failors, and others who were actual apprentices to that employment, at the commencement of the proposed act, to be registered as such (within a limited time) in any of the Colony vice-admiralty courts; and on producing certificates of the same, to pass as British denizens in every respect, except the Newfoundland fishery, for reasons hereafter mentioned. But that no American, except those so registered, shall be esteemed a denizen of Britain, unless he serve an apprenticeship of seven years in a British merchant ship, or has been so long on board a man of war, and likewise become, as far as he can as a seaman, a resident in this country, by his family, should he have one, residing here.

The commercial advantages, besides accession of power, arising to this country, from the principal navigation of the Colonies being carried on in ships of British property, and navigated by British seamen, are so obvious, that they need not be insisted on. However, we shall enumerate a few of them.

1. The profits of the freights of the ships so employed, by coming solely to this country, would

would bring the general balance of trade so much more in our favour, and add to the public revenue by the proportion of taxes paid by the proprietors of the ships, so far as the profits contribute to their support, and likewise increase our population, by the acquisition of such proprietors of ships from America as chuse to continue their property in that employ.

2. The like advantages to the revenue and population will result from those sailors employed in the colony trade who have families, and from their families being resident here, and deriving their support from them or their wages.

To estimate the particular amount of the advantage to Britain from this accession of ships and seamen, it would be necessary to know pretty nearly the number employed.

Dr. Mitchel asserts that the British Colonies in America maintain 45,000 seamen, and another writer * makes it appear that Britain herself employs in that trade far short of 15,000†; therefore, colonists employed, must exceed 30,000; now deducting 5,000 for their own coasting trade, there will remain 25,000 seamen gained to Britain, and, estimating one seaman‡ necessary for every 20 tons burthen of a ship, 500,000 tons of shipping, or ac-

* American Traveller.

† Sailors in the Newfoundland trade, but not the boatmen included.

‡ In very small vessels a greater proportion of hands are required, but in large vessels a less number than the average made use of.

cording to the King's measurement (which bears proportion to the burthen nearly as 3 to 4) 375,000 tons—Now, supposing these ships to be only employed 8 months in the year, and at the freight of 10s. per ton measurement per month* it follows the whole amount will be £. 1,500,000, one-third of which, at least, viz. half a million, would center in this kingdom, as profits to the ship-holders, and maintenance of the families of the sailors.

It may be the opinion of many, that Britain should of right reserve to herself the navigation between the continental Colonies and the West Indies, as well as that of Europe, &c. The principal objection to this is, the shipping employed in that trade would have no occasion ever to come home, and in consequence, the seamen, though British, could have no families in England, and would of course become Americans as they must form their connections there. However, to prevent the growing power of the northern Colonies, who would otherwise continue to be carriers by sea for those of the south, it might be necessary to lay the trade under this restriction, that no ships, British and West Indian excepted, but those belonging to the respective Colony, should be permitted to load in that Colony any cargo for the West Indies, but to have no restraint whatever as to their place of delivery on their return.

* The freight in the transport service at the worst times is 9s. per ton per month, and is now up to 12s. 6d.

S E C T I O N IV.

The subject of the foregoing Section continued.

Newfoundland and Northern Fisheries—Regulations of the Corn-trade of the Colonies, &c.

THE fishery of Newfoundland, we have premised the Colonies should have no share in. It is a source of wealth that ought to be as strictly guarded as the Dutch do their spice trade, as it is of many times the consequence: it is therefore to be lamented, that any European power should share with us any part of it, much more so considerably as our natural rivals do.

What adds greatly to the importance of Newfoundland is, that its fishery not only gives employment to our artificers at home, and a great number of our shipping to convey its produce to market, but likewise occupation to vast numbers of the poor, both in Britain and Ireland, who go out every year to carry on the fishery, and return when it is over to spend the produce of their labour with their families in their own country: thus adding to the imperial-state's population and strength, and affording in time of war, a resource of men able to serve her at sea.

The consumption of fish and all other articles are undoubtedly limited, and when the
number

number in any profession are too numerous, the profits are so far reduced, that those only who are most advantageously situated can carry it on; therefore, the other competitors are necessitated to desist and seek employment elsewhere. The New Englanders are certainly as well, if not better situated than England or Ireland, to carry on this fishery with their own people, consequently, their competition must more and more reduce the number of fishermen sent out from this country, till in the end, from the impossibility of making wages and paying expences, we should send out none at all. Before the restraining act took place, the middle provinces* had, to the decrease of the numbers employed by us, by degrees come to enjoy of themselves almost the principal share of the fishery—Thus it follows, that if the greatest degree of population possible should be maintained in the imperial-state, the Colonies should by no means be allowed to interfere on the banks of Newfoundland, nor indeed from the north of Cape Sable, to the entrance of Davis's Straits.

The produce of the fisheries of Labrador, we have already shewn to be upwards of £. 49,000, and that it is carried on solely by the Americans, who employ there 120 sail of vessels. Now supposing these vessels at 10 men each, there is employed on the coast of

* New England alone employed more ships in the fishery, than both Great Britain and Ireland.

Labrador 1200 men from the middle Colonies, which ought only to be from the British Isles. The Americans may say if we were excluded, you yourselves would not fish there.

This assertion would remain to be proved. If we did not fish there immediately, it would be because our shipping were otherwise advantageously employed; but the knowledge of this resource would soon increase the number of vessels and adventurers, and occasion it quickly to be entered into.

The number of residents in Newfoundland, that remain there throughout the year, I cannot determine; but suppose it must be very considerable from the amount of our exports thither, greatly exceeding all that can be wanted for the people sent out from Britain and Ireland. The ships employed by these countries in the trade and fishery are 380, carrying, one with another, 12 men; in all 4560. The fishery likewise employs 2000 boats with 8 men each, manned by the people sent out, and by the residents; together 16000 boatmen.

The amount of exports thither from Britain and Ireland, in coarse cloathing, fishing-tackle, beef, pork, British-spirits, gun-powder, shot, &c. is £. 273,400. And the exports from Newfoundland to the different parts of Europe, in cod-fish and oil, value on the spot, are £. 345,000.*—Thus they were as stated by the

* Fish £. 300,000, oil £. 45,000.

American Traveller. Since then they have added to their exports a considerable quantity of seal skins and some salmon.

It must be observed very little of the fish, and a part only of the oil come to England, but go mostly to foreign markets, so that the greatest part of our export is a net balance in our favour. The great importance of this, and still greater of creating and giving employ to such vast numbers of sailors and fishermen, are advantages not to be equalled by any other settlement or branch of commerce, and cannot be too much kept to ourselves.

Philadelphia, New York, and some ports of New England, supply the land and fishery with flour, biscuits and grain, viz. pease, barley, &c.

The same Author we quoted in the beginning of the 2d section observes, that “ Britain in good policy, ought to have kept
“ the supply of the West Indies with grain
“ entirely to herself*, instead of the uncertain
“ corn-trade she has with Europe, because the
“ demand would be perfectly regular, and no
“ where else is to be found such considerable
“ bodies of people, that depend for their daily
“ bread solely on importation.”

If this observation be just for the West Indies, it will be equally so for our supplying

* The freight to either Newfoundland or the West Indies would not be high, because most vessels go to these places in ballast, and would consequently be content with a small freight out.

Newfoundland with grain from Britain and Ireland only.

If Great Britain and Ireland afforded a constant surplus of grain above their own consumption, this argument would have been scarcely controvertible; but when we consider that Britain and Ireland frequently import large quantities for their own consumption, both from the Baltic and America, would it not in those years be occasioning both the West Indies and Newfoundland, to come much dearer by their provisions, by their corn having undergone two long voyages, viz. from America to England and back again to those American islands, than if they had been allowed to have the same grain immediately from the place of its growth in their own neighbourhood? Being limited to this channel, they would, in these instances, receive their grain with the additional charges of double, instead of single freight, insurance, interest of money, danger of heating,* commission, &c. so that the consequences must be unavoidably felt.

It is the interest of every country that has rival nations in any manufacture, although it can raise the raw materials within itself, to procure them from where they can be had cheapest, that they may not, by endeavouring to retain the profit on a part, lose the sale of the whole.

* Against which there is no insurance, as grain of all kinds is warranted free from average, unless general, or the ship be stranded.

This reason will have the same weight in the importation of grain, because provisions of all kinds, are, in strict justice, *a raw material in every manufacture*, more especially in those that derive their principal value from labour. The price of labour, or hire of men, depends not only on the number that offer themselves for hire, but likewise on the price of provisions. Were labourers plentiful, it would depend entirely upon the latter, as, from this cause, we find in the interior parts of Russia, men are to be hired at 4 or 5 copecks, or about 2d. to 2½ d. per day. However, in all places, the price of labour is more or less affected by that of provisions. In countries where there is full employment for all that will labour, a fall in price of provisions, will not for some time affect or lower the wages, but on the contrary, should provisions rise and keep high, we may soon expect a rise in the hire of men; what else is the principal cause* of wages being so much higher now, than they were a century or two since? Where employment is more plentiful than men, this consequent rise will be the sooner effected, but even in the other case, it must in the end inevitably follow, as men cannot work for less than will afford them a bare subsistence.

* The great increase throughout Europe of specie, and its representative paper-currency, and the debasement of our coin, are causes of a proportionate advance of labour, since those periods, but not of the excess it is now arrived at.

Now,

SECTION IV. 29

Now, as the produce of fisheries derive their value almost totally from *labour*, an increase of this *charge* would unavoidably give our rivals the advantage over us, and occasion our decline, therefore, the cheaper provisions can be afforded in Newfoundland, the more advantage to the empire.

The ill consequences attending an advance in the price of provisions in the West Indies, are still more striking, because the labour of the Negroes depends solely on the price of provisions, at least with those who possess the Negroes they employ. Provisions and hire of money * are the raw materials of, and principal charges on sugar, rum, coffee, cotton, &c. therefore the nation at whose settlements the price of provisions and interest of money are the lowest, *ceteris paribus*, will be able to carry its West India trade, and those dependent on it, to the highest pitch.

This dissertation on the effects of the price of provisions in Newfoundland and the West Indies, carries us forward to consider whether the same policy be not necessary in the Parent-state.

This kingdom is a commercial one, and derives great part of its stability and power from the export of its manufactures, and in the vend of most of them has to contend with a rival power, that from the lower price

* The capitals employed in Negroes, &c.

of labour has introduced the produce of its fabricks into markets where we formerly had almost the sole vend. It is not to be disputed that the French in a great measure supply Turkey, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and the Dutch for the Spanish contraband trade from Curacao, St. Eustatia, &c. with their woollen stuffs, and that the demand of them still increases to the detriment of our own, even in places, where, by the faith of treaties, it ought to be otherwise. What is this owing to? To no other cause but the cheapness of labour in France; not to the goodness of their materials * or excellence of their workmanship, for we exceed them in these.

Does it not then behove this kingdom to seek out some remedy? It certainly does, and requires no more than to enable the labourer to live cheaper than he may labour for less. The only means to effect this, we have before proved, is to allow a free importation of provisions—And as free an exportation is necessary, except in cases of famine, to give due encouragement to our produce at home, that we may be the less dependent on foreign supplies.

Before that excellent act of 13 Geo. III. chap. 43. for which the nation is chiefly in-

* The French, in many of their woollen stuffs, cannot do without a certain proportion of English or Irish wool; great quantities of both, notwithstanding our laws to the contrary, and the *enhanced price* on account of the risk, they contrive to obtain.

debted to Governor Pownal, the importation and exportation were so uncertain and fluctuating, that generally after a large export, and sometimes without it, the nation was left without a sufficient stock of grain; the price advanced, the poor wanted bread, and riots were frequent throughout the kingdom. These disagreeable events cannot well happen again, since the import and export are regulated by the above act; but we still can never expect to see bread very cheap, or labour low, because whenever the price of wheat falls below 5s. 6d. per bushel the importation* is immediately stopped, and when it falls a little lower, as if we were afraid labour would become too cheap in the kingdom, we immediately give a bounty of 5s. per quarter to have our wheat carried out until again

* Rye when below 3s. 6d. per bushel, is exportable, with a bounty of 3s. per quarter. Barley when below 2s. 9d. with 2s. 6d. bounty, and oats when below 1s. 9d. with 2s. bounty per quarter, or 8 bushels.

By the same act when the prices of grain, returned at the quarter sessions, are at or above the following rates they may be imported, chargeable only with the payment of some trivial duties, for the purpose of determining the quantity.

Wheat is importable when at or above 6s. per bushel. Rye when at 4s. per bushel. Barley at 3s. and oats at 2s. per bushel.

When the prices are below those rates and above the former, British grain is not exportable, nor foreign to be imported, without it be lodged under the joint locks of the merchant and custom-house, until such time as it shall be exported foreign, or the prices in the county where it lies, as returned at the quarter sessions, be above the rates last mentioned.

it

it advance above that price. This is perhaps carried to our rivals to afford them to feed their manufacturers cheaper than we do our own. That they may do it is plain, when we consider that the freight from Suffex and Hampshire, which are corn countries, to any part of France in the channel, will be in general only from 1s. to 1s. 6d. and even in the Bay of Biscay will not exceed 2s. 6d. per quarter, when at the same time the bounty on export is 5s.

How different is the conduct of our rivals! Are their manufactures in want! The importation is immediately encouraged by high bounties. So lately as April or May 1775, on a scarcity of grain, the French King issued an edict, offering to all importers, as well in foreign vessels as French, that should arrive with foreign grain in any French port from the 15th May to the 1st Aug. then ensuing, a premium of 18 sols, about 3s. per quarter, for every quintal of wheat, and 12 sols, about 2s. per quarter, for every quintal of rye. It was also ordered, that all such ships should be exempted at that time from the payment of the duty on freight, or any other whatsoever. This edict had its desired effect: corn was poured into France till it became cheaper there than at the places from whence it came.

The ostensible intent of our bounty on export, and limitation of import in England, is to encourage our farmers to grow grain, that
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the kingdom may not be drained of specie in purchasing it from abroad; but that, on the contrary, by selling the productions of our land to foreign countries, we may increase the general balance and relative riches of the kingdom. These reasons are plausible, but how the intent is defeated, we will hereafter shew. The latent, and we may suppose principal cause of these regulations, is to enable the farmers to pay the present high rents to the landholders, but herein they distress the kingdom without benefitting themselves at all, as to what they consume of our own internal produce.

From the highness of rents the price of provisions have rose, consequently the price of labour and of our manufactures, likewise the wages of servants and price of horses. In these, I presume, the principal part of all rents or other incomes are spent. Besides this, the bounty is a charge upon the nation that is in general thrown away without answering the ostensible end; that is, of disposing to foreigners a greater quantity of the produce of our lands than we otherwise should do. For instance, in the latter part of the summer of 1775, the counties of Northumberland, Durham, and York were exporting corn to foreigners with a bounty, when at the same time some of the ports on the other side of the island were importing from abroad. Thus what came in on one hand went out on the

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other, and the bounty was thrown away to no purpose.—As the crops of grain are never equally good throughout all parts of the kingdom, this must frequently happen; but were there no bounty, the exporters would find it their interest to supply the dearer markets in their own kingdom as well as those of other countries.

We have before said it is true policy, to allow at all times the free import and export (except in cases of famine) of all provisions; let us now see the consequence.

We should, from our superior situation to Holland, whose ports in winter are frequently blocked up with ice, and are at all times, from want of water, more difficult of access than ours, become the granary of Europe*. From us every southern nation that wanted would be supplied with grain, either our own produce or that of other countries, which would increase the number of our seamen and of labourers in our ports, for the loading and unloading of ships.

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* I have heard some men of sense assert, that from the act of 13 Geo. III. commonly called Pownall's act, the kingdom has the same opportunity of becoming the granary of Europe, as if the imports and exports were unlimited. To point out the error of this opinion, we need only observe, "that trade will never seek those channels where there are many restraints, but ever flow where it is the least interrupted."

What principally occasions Holland to be the European store-house, is not only the freedom of import and export,
but

The price of provisions would fall, labour and our manufactures would become cheaper, and the demand for them would encrease, which would encrease the number of manufacturers. Thus the necessaries of life being low, and employment sufficient for all that would labour, *this would become the country for people to emigrate to*; and the nation would encrease in population, riches, revenue, naval power and internal strength.—What events are more to be desired?

Our farmers would still have encouragement to cultivate their lands; for labour being cheaper, they could afford their products for less, and besides, would always get much more for them than the farmers of the countries we imported from, because upon the produce of those foreigners all the following charges must fall before it could be sold here, viz. commission abroad, charges on shipping, freight, insurance, risk of heating

but the chance of selling the articles for their own consumption. Now, although by the above act we can freely export the grain we have imported, we cannot, if the port was not open at the time of its entry, make use of it at home until the price rises so high, as to admit the import: and what is still worse, it cannot, while the port where it is landed remains shut, be exported to the other parts in the kingdom, that are *in want of*, and *open for grain from abroad*. Thus the merchant that has imported is losing the interest of his money, and rent of ware-houses, and has every reason to wish his corn was still laying in the country it came from, because, though not from his own granaries where it lays at hand, it would then be admissible in places where it might be sold—very frequently to the next port.

and other damage, charges of landing, interest of money and commission at home, besides ware-house rent at one end or the other, and sometimes at both.

The cheapness of labour, and these circumstances considered, what have our farmers or even landholders to fear. From the greater population there would be a home consumption for every article they could raise. A further effect of the increase of population will be, the present towns must increase, and perhaps new ones arise, both of which would evidently tend to the advantage of the landed interest, as it is well known all lands in the vicinity of towns bear excessive rents, because convenient and necessary for the various purposes of the inhabitants.

The government would likewise find the advantage of all these consequences, not only from the revenue being increased, but from the same amount of revenue going further, in proportion to the cheapness of every thing, than it now does. Those who enjoy places or pensions under government would be benefitted as much as if their incomes were now raised in the same proportion, that the labour and the conveniences and necessaries of life would then fall.

This may appear a digression, but has naturally arose out of the subject we were upon, —the regulating the commerce of the middle Colonies, (whose principal produce is grain) so as to be beneficial to the Mother-country.

We

We have endeavoured to prove how necessary it is for us, as a commercial nation, *and by commerce only the greatest power is attainable*, to have the price of provisions low, and that at the same time it is our interest that the countries who rival us (in manufactures) shall not have them cheaper.

We have now only to consider how far the corn trade of America can be made conducive to these ends.

It cannot be, if we suffer them to export directly to Europe without any restriction, for then they would rival us in the trade we have been laying the basis of. Their unlimited trade with provisions to our West India islands and Newfoundland (from which we have no occasion to exclude ourselves) would afford them an ample market whenever they could sell on as good terms or better than we, which from their situation and other circumstances they might always do, unless on some general failure of their crop. Then if we admit their grain to free import in Britain and Ireland to be either used or re-exported, as circumstances chance to determine, they would have every necessary indulgence, and we should reap the advantages before enumerated attendant on being the European granary. Now, as the whole of our Colony trade to Europe (as before premised) would be in British ships, it might not be unadvisable to allow them to export direct to Europe, on the payment of
a duty

a duty on export, equivalent to the advantages we should otherwise reap; suppose of 6d. per bushel, or 4s. sterling per quarter on wheat, and the same on flour, (allowing 4cwt. to the quarter, as in England, for the bounty.)

The common freight of grain from America to any port of Europe without the Streights is 8s. per quarter, and if up the Mediterranean 10s. Therefore as the freight to England is as low as to any part of Europe, it follows, that if the Americans chuse to ship their grain direct to the place of its consumption, the foreign consumers would come by it 6d. per bushel dearer than we could have it at home, which we have before proved is necessary to prevent successful rivalship of our manufactures. The same reasons will induce us not to suffer the exportation from America to the foreign West India islands without a like charge of 4s. per quarter on wheat and flour, and proportionate on other grain. This we may do without danger, because they cannot even then be supplied so cheap from elsewhere.

That wheat is an article that will bear a duty of 4s. per quarter on export to Europe has been already proved by the Congress, who laid on a much heavier one; *no less than 40 per cent. ad valorem**, on permitting some of

* The author received this information in a letter from his friend in Lisbon.

the last cargoes to fail that came from Philadelphia before the blocking up of the ports. Now valuing this wheat so low as 25s. 40 per cent. amounts to 10s. per quarter: *Rather too heavy a charge, but what it really bore at that time.*

The saving of the duty of 4s. per quarter would, in my opinion, generally induce the American grain to come by the way of Britain, because of the chance of finding a market, and that if it did not, the charges of unloading, shipping, and sending to any port this side the Straights' mouth, would not exceed 4s. per quarter, and if they went further they would only incur the same additional advance of freight they would had they gone direct from America.

But supposing the grain in general shipped from America, direct for the port of consumption, they could never rival us to our detriment, because our merchants might always send their corn, whether British produce or imported, to any port this side the Straights' mouth, for 4s. per quarter or less. Thus our landholders would have, in all the European markets, at least the whole freight from America, 8s. per quarter, advantage over these in the colonies, which they in return are compensated for by the supply of Newfoundland, and our West India islands, and THEIR EXEMPTION FROM INTERNAL TAXATION, *which must ever be had in view.*

Besides

Besides this duty, although laid on for the regulation of commerce, would raise a considerable revenue for the use of the empire, and have, as the American grain is the principal rival of ours in the southern markets, the same effect, as a bounty of the like amount, on British grain would otherwise have, which, on the contrary, would diminish the revenue.

This system it appears, will prevent all the ill effects we might otherwise feel from the rivalry of our northern Colonies, and instead of being detrimental, will render them, as much as possible, beneficial to the Parent-state: and as to the general free import and export of grain, we may deduce, that it would be productive of the most happy consequences to this kingdom, all which, it will be unnecessary to recapitulate. As for the fears of the landholders, we have shewn they have no real foundation, because of the many charges on grain, before it can be imported; therefore, foreign corn can never be used, even in the sea ports of this kingdom, till our own be dearer by the amount of all those charges. Besides, as long as there are monied men in Europe, who are ready to speculate where there may be any advantage, the price of grain can never, even in the most plentiful years, fall any thing considerably below the general average of prices: and further, the landed interest so far from having any thing
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to fear, have every thing to expect, because from the produce of the taxes going further, and the field of taxation, by the increase of subjects, being enlarged, the revenue without being lessened, would fall lighter on individuals, and at the same time, afford the means of diminishing and paying off the debt of the nation, the interest* alone of which, is almost equal to all our other national expences, on a peace establishment, and consequently, the cause of our taxes being now double what they otherwise might be.

* £. 4,464,071, in 1775. Doctor Price's Appendix to observations on civil liberty.

SECTION V.

On the probable causes of the insurrection in America, and the subject of the third section further considered.

WE have before premised *the Parent-state should have the regulation of the commerce of its Colonies.* This is allowed by all nations, and is so obviously necessary a return for founding and protecting Colonies, that the chiefs of the New England faction dared never absolutely deny, or attempt to controvert it.

Now what is the regulation of commerce, but the admitting or prohibiting the exportation or importation of any article to or from any particular country?

This being allowed, it certainly follows that the power which can admit or prohibit, can, if it find necessary, prohibit only in part, or under certain restrictions, that is, liable to certain duties; from which the deduction is plain *that the Parent-state has a right to impose port duties.* This right the Colonies in general since their settlement until the 7th Geo. III. chap. 46, laying a duty on paper, glass, painters colours, and teas never thought of opposing, although so far back as the 25th of Charles II.* an act was passed laying duties on

* Chap. 7. The same duties were continued by 7 and 8 W. and M. chap. 22, and 1 Geo. I. chap. 11.

the export of sugars, tobacco, cotton-wool, indigo, ginger, logwood, fustic, and all other dying woods, and cocoa nuts, shipped in any of the plantations to be carried to any other of them. In the 6th of George II. * a duty was laid on all foreign rum, or spirits, molasses, syrups, sugars and panneles imported into the plantations.

Besides these, the former of which, notwithstanding its preamble, could answer no other end but the raising a revenue, several similar acts were passed at different times previous to the year 1763; the same situation they were in at which period the Americans gave out they desired only to be placed.—If they really meant as they said, they allowed the British legislature an undoubted right to impose external taxes for all purposes whatever.

On putting in force the act for collecting a duty on paper, &c. imported into our Colonies, the Americans, as just now observed, began to cavil about the right of this country to do so. The author of the Farmer's Letters, though one of the most strenuous American advocates in this cause, admits, in its full extent, the right of Britain to grant port duties, when laid on for the regulation of commerce; but contends, that, when imposed for the purpose of raising a revenue, as the preamble to the forementioned act set forth,

* Chap. 13. The duties continued by 29 Geo. II. chap. 26, and 1 Geo. III. chap. 9.

that then it is a stretch of power and subversive of the liberties of the Colonies. His principal arguments rest on the ill use Great Britain might make of this power while she restrains the Americans in their manufactures.

But should Britain give up the right of the latter (which she has only exercised in some particular points*) which this author allows her to possess, or if she disclaim all right to the retention of excise, if any, and the payment of duty on the import of manufactures restrained, his arguments will fall to the ground.

The people of New England in particular, and the other Northern Colonies, notwithstanding their enjoying greater liberty and exemption from taxes than any other civilized people on the face of the earth, have long been impatient of controul, and independency has been their favourite theme, as many who have resided there can witness.

The Swedish Professor Kalm, who travelled through these provinces on botanical researches in the years 1748 and 1749, observes, that "the inhabitants of the English Colonies were "growing less tender to their Mother-country," and after advancing their restrictions in commerce, and the great accession of foreigners, who generally have no particular attachment to Old England, as reasons for their coolness,

* In preventing the erection of sitting and rolling mills for iron, mills for the manufacturing of steel, &c. &c.

he mentions this further one: "That many people can never be contented, but suffer their excess of liberty and their luxury often to lead them into licentiousness." He further says, "they informed him the English North-American Colonies would, in the space of 30 or 50 years, be able to form a state of themselves independant of Old England."—How far they are able time must determine: their readiness to make the attempt they have already shewn.

That Independency has been from the very beginning of the present dispute the design of the American leaders, there is great reason to believe, notwithstanding they made the tax on tea their ostensible cause; for at that time the body of the Americans, conscious of the easy government under which they lived, were not ready to receive that doctrine, which their leaders since, by sticking at no means, though ever so false, to inflame their passions, have gradually prepared them for. That to answer their purpose they were not ashamed of asserting untruths, is sufficiently obvious from their giving out to the multitude, that the tax on tea was an innovation and infringement of their liberties, and that the British Parliament never taxed them before; although they could not but know some, at least, of the precedents just now quoted.

There was however a second cause that much promoted the present troubles (for the
infor-

information of which I am obliged to a gentleman, who resided some time in Boston) which was, that Mr H——k and some other leaders of the faction were largely concerned in smuggling cargoes of tea from Holland, &c. which trade, so beneficial to themselves, the regulation on tea put a stop to, as the contraband trader had then, supposing his cargo bought as cheap as in England, and successfully landed, only three-pence advantage over the fair dealer, instead of one shilling as formerly.—Such was the difference (in favour of America) occasioned by drawing back on exportation the whole English duty, and laying on a duty in America of only three-pence per pound, in the place of retaining in England one shilling on the drawback, which was the case before when exported to America. This advantage to the Americans was so much loss to the contraband dealers, in proportion to the trade they carried on, and which trade they saw, notwithstanding they still in general, because the duty was not repealed, persisted in their agreement for the non-import of this article, would in all probability be annihilated, should the East India Company,* in consequence of the act passed for that purpose, be permitted to sell their tea in America. This determined them to prevent it, which they did in Boston effectually, by influencing a

* Their mode of sale was to have been the same as in London, in lots by auction.

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mob, or people of superior condition, to disguise themselves as Indians, go on board the ships, and throw the tea of the East India Company into the sea.

The loss of this contraband trade being likely to produce a sensible diminution of profit to the before-mentioned persons, joined with their love of independency, has been the unhappy means of deluging their country with blood, and reducing innumerable families from affluence to distress. If the laying on of this duty in America, or making it payable there, was an infringement of their natural rights, certainly the retaining part of the drawback was equally so, as the law permitted them to import none but what they bought of us. This grievance, which was one if the other be, they never complained of, and as we are necessitated to have custom-house officers in America to collect the duties imposed for the regulation of commerce, on articles that come direct from the place of their produce, as well as for other purposes, what difference could it make to America whether the duty was collected by the officers there, or retained in England? In the latter case they would have to pay so much the more for the article which would drain their country of specie equally the same, as if the duties were collected there and remitted to Britain (if the taxes were superior to the expences of government there, which they are not). And in
either

either case, the duty, whether retained or collected, is equally for the purpose of raising a revenue, as it could not be for the regulation of trade, the import being admitted from no where else, therefore the retaining of drawbacks or part of them is equally subversive of American liberty, as the imposition of similar duties there. As they did not oppose the retaining of the duty in England, though confined to take these articles from thence, if they took them at all, it plainly follows, that the duties being made payable in America could be to them no object of dispute. They had it equally in their option to refrain from importing the tea, and paying the tax, as they had before from buying it charged with the English duty. And if, in the former case, English residents sent it to them contrary to their inclinations, those who sent it paid the tax, though collected in America. The Americans could not be said to pay it until they purchased the article on which it was laid, and this was as much in their power to refuse as before.

Let us now enquire into the objections against a Parent-state possessing the power of laying port-duties on its Colonies (towards the maintenance of its own fleets and armies, &c. for their mutual protection) and whether, by an abuse of this power, she can hurt the interest of her Colonies without equally affecting her own.

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The principal objections I have heard urged, are :

Those who lay on the tax do not feel it ; and as the produce is to be applied in aid, or to the diminution of their own taxes, will be induced to lay it too heavy ; and that being improper judges, from not residing in the country taxed, will be liable to lay imposts on improper articles.

Admitting these to be true, what are the consequences ?

1. It is well known the American Continental Colonies can, and do raise more provisions than they can consume ; therefore the legislative power by taxing, or even absolutely prohibiting the import of these first necessities of life, cannot, as the Carthaginians sometimes did with their dependent province of Sardinia, starve, or in any wise affect the people.

Should it be said they (the legislative authority) have it in their power to starve the West India Islands :—Doubtless ; but can it be supposed they would be so devoid of reason, as to tax there the necessities of life on importation, when the consequence would be depopulating our most beneficial Colonies, or raising the price of their staple commodities so much, on the part we consume ourselves, and perhaps rendering them too dear for re-exportation to foreign markets, by which we should bring ruin on the planters, a consequent de-

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cay of trade to our own manufactures, and want of employ to our shipping?

2. Suppose an exorbitant tax on tea, and the luxuries of life.—These being rendered dear can produce no ill effect, nor can, as not being essentially necessary, be any detriment to the health or real happiness of those who would consume them; and besides, could produce no advantage to the taxers, because, by greatly lessening the consumption, the revenue would be lessened, though the tax be raised, and such great inducement given to smuggling, that of the lessened consumption but a small part would be legally imported; for whenever the probability of gain is greater than the risque of loss (which is always the case in articles of considerable specific value, when the duty is higher than the first cost) no consideration will hinder some men from pursuing what appears to be their interest. And though many of these men would not defraud individuals, they think it not criminal to defraud government, which should represent the whole body of individuals in the state, because say they, and perhaps with some degree of justice, the revenues it does receive are not all applied in the manner they ought to be; therefore why should not we come in for a share of the spoils?

3. Should a nation lay a duty on the Colony import of its manufactures—the Colonists have their remedy by manufacturing for themselves

selves: therefore, this the state will never do unless it be on an article that can be had from, or produced no where else: then the state has a right, if the other chuse to buy, to sell at its own price, that is, charged with such duties as they please. But even this remedies itself; for the Colonists have it in their option not to buy, and this they certainly will do very sparingly if raised too high by taxes: therefore the taxing power will find the disadvantage two-fold: in the first place, by lessening the produce of the tax; and in the second, by losing the employ of their manufacturers, and consequently the taxes paid by them on the consumption of their wages; likewise by a continuance of such policy, a proportionate emigration from the want of such employ.

Lord Chatham, and at the same time a favourite with the Americans, was of opinion, they should be restrained from manufacturing even for themselves, and went so far as to assert, that the very nail of a horse-shoe should not be made in America. Now to restrain them in manufacturing, and to retain the power of taxing the import of what they could manufacture themselves, is to compel them to take goods at our own price, and leaves them without remedy; therefore it is incompatible with liberty, and improper, that we should hold the power of both absolutely restraining their manufactures, and laying port-

duties : consequently if the Parent-state retain the latter power, she should part with the former, as oppressive to the Colonies, or at least (as before observed) so far as relates to the manufactures restrained, which is what she has hitherto uniformly done.

We have now considered the effects of duties on imports.—It remains to be discussed, how far the Colonies can be injured by the duties on exports.

The right of prohibition, as before-mentioned, has never been denied a Parent-state, but it is expected, she only exercise this right in circumstances that would interfere with herself. Now, the export of articles or produce, she herself raises, are evidently among those that interfere with her, and which, she ought to enjoy solely on account of her great internal taxes, and the burthen she bears of maintaining a naval and military power, to protect the whole empire.

However, these articles she may either totally prohibit, or permit the export of with such restrictions, as not much to affect herself: and as her different Colonies lie in different climates, it is necessary she look on them as separate states, and limit their commercial intercourse with each other, otherwise those in a similar climate with herself, would reap all the advantage she should do in supplying them with her produce and manufactures,

tures*; whereas, each Colony manufacturing for its own consumption, is as much as is consistent with real liberty to itself, and sound policy in the Parent-state.

As to other articles, should the Mother-country clog their export with heavy duties, she consults not her own interest, and it will fall more heavily upon herself, than on the country taxed—For if she consumes the articles, it is plain she pays the taxes, as they fall ultimately on the consumer; and should she render them too dear for foreign markets, she likewise feels the ill effects, because, from having the sole carrying trade, she loses the freight of those articles; and besides, as the colony imports, which go entirely through her hands, can only at the most be equal to their exports, it is plain she deprives herself, either of supplying them with articles of her own to so great an amount as she might have done, or otherwise, of the freight of foreign

* In some instances, our legislature has guarded against the Colonies rivaling the Mother-country, in the export of manufactures, or in supplying one Colony with the manufacture of another, as by 10 and 11 William III. chap 10, it is enacted, that no woollen manufactures of the product of the British plantations in America, shall there be laden on board any ship, or upon any horse, with intent to be exported, upon forfeiture of ship, goods, &c. and £. 500: and by the 5 George II. chap. 22, no hats or felts are to be shipped on board any vessel, or loaded on any horse, cart, or other carriage, in order to be conveyed out of *any of the British Plantations, to any other of the British Plantations, or to any other place whatsoever*, upon forfeiture of the hats and felts and £. 500.

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commodities, with the port duties she might find prudent to lay upon them.

From all the foregoing premises it is apparent, that in such a system as “that of retaining the power of laying port duties *only*, and carrying on solely the active sea commerce (at the same time giving up the restraint on colony manufacture, or at least the right of reserving any part of the excise at home, or laying any duty whatsoever on the import of those articles so restrained)” the Parent-state could never oppress the Colonies without affecting herself more deeply; and what greater tie or security can there be for her not doing it? It is the same security the non-electors (or non-voters) in Britain have, and greater cannot be had by any means whatever.

Colonies settled on an extensive continent, and perpetually increasing in people, till at last they become many times as populous as the Parent-state, must, in the course of human events, some time or other become independent; but according to the proposed system, one may presume it would be at a very distant period, and then only owing to some great revolution in the Parent-state; for when exempt from all the burthen of internal taxation, except maintaining their own subordinate, executive, and civil power, and unrestrained in manufacturing for their own use (or where restrained, free from all home excise and duties
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of import) what temptation could Colonies have to wish for independence, because if effected, the consequent necessary establishment of naval and military power would require an increase of taxes, and far heavier burthens than they before endured.

Likewise as commercial Colonies (for though not enjoying the property of ships, they would still have merchants) they would, from the want of a navy, and the Parent-state being so very powerful at sea, be a long time prevented; for the Mother-country, from carrying on both their sea commerce and her own, would, at such period as they were ripe for revolt, not only be able to block up all their ports, but from her immensely numerous navy prevent the interference of any other power.

Their mode of government would likewise long prevent an aim at independency, and at the same time leave the people the full enjoyment of liberty; that is, the House of Representatives to be elected by them, and the other two estates, the Council and Governor, to be appointed during pleasure from the central power, as was the case, before these disturbances, in all the royal governments.

Governor Barnard, in the 86th proposition in his Principles of Law and Polity, observes, "there is no government in America at present, where the powers are properly balanced, "there not being in any of them a real and
" distinct

“ distinct third legislative power mediating between the King and the People, which is the present excellence of the British constitution.”

The observation is undoubtedly very just, as the Council, which is the middle power, are either appointed by the crown, during pleasure, and consequently as dependent upon it as the governor, or in other Colonies chosen by the people; or the lower-house, and then become so much addition to the popular scale, therefore, no mediating power in either case.

A remedy to this inconvenience, the Governor points out in his 88th and 89th propositions, viz.

“ 88. Although America is not now (and probably will not be for many years to come) ripe enough for an hereditary nobility; yet it is now capable of a nobility for life.”

“ 89. A nobility appointed by the King for life, and made independent, would probably give strength and stability to the American governments as effectually, as an hereditary nobility does to that of Great Britain.”

An appointment from the imperial state, or even from the crown, of the middle power, or the council (or whatever name it may be called by) would certainly be productive of good consequences, and prevent in a great measure this mediating power from being dependent on either the King or the people; but an hereditary nobility, which Governor Barnard,

nard, in his 88th proposition, seems to think may be adviseable in some future period, can, in my opinion, never be so.

It appears nearly * as dangerous to admit or establish an hereditary aristocratic power in America, as it is to have the council elected by the lower house, for it would in the same manner weaken the influence of the Parent-state, and occasion them much sooner to dispute her negative in her laws, which, as well as the power of regulating commerce and laying port duties, should be invested in the three estates † of King, Lords, and Commons.

Internal taxation, by a distant power, differs widely from external; because there is in the former no mode of avoiding being oppressed by the taxes, should they be exorbitant, but by the last resource of arms, and this always uncertain in the event; and because the assessors, by laying taxes or excises on manufactures, may, in some measure, force the sale of their own, though likewise charged with a duty, but less heavy; hence it follows, that by internal taxation they may extort great sums from the colonies or dependent

* Not quite, because the nobles deriving their titles from the crown, would in some degree be attached to it, and more liable to be brought over to its interest, or that of the imperial state, by motives either honorary or pecuniary, than men only elected to hold their places for a short time.

† At present it lays in the breast of the king and council.

states so taxed, without any inconvenience resulting to themselves.

Therefore the taxed could never rest assured that their burthens would not be further increased. The contrary we have shewn to be the case in external taxation, because the taxed could never be oppressed without greater inconveniencies redounding to the taxers.

There can be little doubt, that since the repeal of the Stamp Act, government never intended to impose any internal tax on the Americans, notwithstanding by the Declaratory Act they asserted they had a right to tax them in all cases whatever. However it is much to be lamented, that our legislature did not rescind that declaration.—And that government, in their offers of accommodation to the Americans, did not assure them they would give up all right to internal taxation, and even external, on articles of manufacture wherein they were restrained, as these, though unexercised, (and not the port-duties, as has been pointed out) could ever be matters of real grievance, therefore as a lover of justice and the rights of human nature, as far as can be enjoyed in civil compact, I sincerely wish that government, in their offers of reconciliation, would be explicit in these points, and that even should America, by continuing refractory, be conquered, as there is the greatest probability of, that they would then impose no other terms than such as they should now offer, for by these means they will
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win and retain the affections and allegiance of the Colonies, the object of their mutual interest, even long after they become sufficiently powerful to assert and maintain their own independence.

One thing we have left unnoticed, which is, that no colony legislature should possess the power of levying, for their own purposes, duties of import or export, or laying any local duties of exit or transit on goods in the interior parts of the continent, nor the raising any excise (for their own consumption excepted) on exportable commodities, as by these means they might defeat every advantage to be derived to the imperial state from the regulation of the port-duties.

S E C T I O N VI.

On the propriety of resistance to port-duties, and the advantages America receives from her dependence on this country.

FROM all the conclusions that have been heretofore drawn, it appears the demands of the Mother-country have been just, and therefore, the present resistance of the Americans, has originated from a turbulent and seditious spirit, impatient of all controul, unmindful of the most sacred ties, allegiance to and gratitude for protection and defence against their enemies, and their peculiar felicity of bearing a trivial part of all those burthens and expences that fall with redoubled weight on their fellow subjects in Britain.*

It is too obvious that from the very beginning, the Bostonians intended to break with the Mother-country at all events. All Europe knows the destroying the tea was not the sudden outrage of a mob, but the long premeditated act of some of the principal men of the province—Had they not wished the pre-

* The sums that were raised in the Colonies of New England, &c. towards the prosecuting with vigour the late war, and were afterwards refunded by our parliament, have frequently been quoted as instances of loyalty and generosity in the Colonies, but to me appear nothing more than what they owed to self-defence, and afford a striking instance of the liberality of this nation, in refunding those sums.

sent event, would they not, consistent with the principles of justice and honour, have offered restitution from the province, to the proprietors of the effects destroyed?*

They certainly used every endeavour to promote what they have effectuated—to inflame the minds of the people by an aggravation of supposed injuries and imaginary evils to rise against government, which, in a good cause would be a just insurrection; but in an unjust one can be termed nothing but rebellion.

It is a melancholy reflection, which experience has proved to be too true, that those who cry out the most for liberty, are seldom genuine lovers of it: all they aim at is, to debase their superiors to their own level or beneath it, not to advance those whom fortune has placed below them, to the same rank with themselves: for when possessed of power, we generally find them the greatest tyrants—Liberty with them, consists in freely exercising their own will, whether or no it counteract the wills, and in consequence restrain the liberties of others—What more is the wish of a despot? These American contenders for freedom, so far from being animated by a general love of liberty any further than concerns themselves, never think of emancipating their poor slaves, but look upon them as little

* The friends of their party say, the agent of the province had orders to offer restitution; but that the offer was made does not appear.

better

better than beasts of the field, or domestic animals, though men as well as they, possessed of the same feelings, and only differing from them in colour—They behold their miseries with the most unfeeling apathy, and regret not their misfortunes or death, any further than the loss of so much property as their future labour might have been worth.

In their criminal laws, or the execution of them, it is notorious, the wretch who destroys a negro, either by a series of cruelty or immediate murder, shall escape the punishment due to his crime; but should one of those unfortunate creatures be guilty of the smallest offence, severe justice will not be delayed.

A very humane writer, in a treatise on slavery, and the expediency of its abolition, published in Burlington, New Jersey, in the year 1773, sensible of liberty in his countrymen being of that partial nature just explained, thus addresses them:

“ Let us reconcile our practice to our avowed principles. Let not our professions of an inviolable attachment to liberty, of late so frequently echoed from one end of the continent to the other, be contradicted by a practice as unjust as it is impolitic—that of keeping our fellow-creatures in a state of *perpetual slavery*.”

The New England Colonies were settled principally by those who fled from religious perse-

persecution, and they with great reason preached up religious liberty; but soon as they acquired power, what was the consequence? Behold! they turned persecutors themselves, and destroyed without mercy those who preached different tenets, though professing equally with them christianity. The same intolerant spirit inimical to liberty still prevails with them.

At the very time they destroyed the tea and were declaiming against government for taxing an external product, that they might either use or not, which they termed taking their money without their consent, they had no less than 18 Anabaptist and 2 Quaker preachers imprisoned in Boston*, for not giving their consent to part with their money contrary to the charter of the province; because they would not pay tithes to the presbyterian ministry, who had assumed to themselves the right of exacting them from those of other persuasions, although neither they, in preference, or any other sect were authorized by charter to demand them. These are the men who preach up universal liberty, but have their actions corresponded!

The author of the pamphlet entitled Common Sense, says, "the English Americans" have never reaped any advantage from their

* This article is given on the authority of a Pennsylvania gentleman of veracity, who left that country on the breaking out of the present troubles.

“connection with Britain, and that it would
 “have been happy for them, if they had
 “never had any thing to do with her.” Was
 ever a more palpable falsehood asserted, and
 this for the purpose of misleading a people? If
 England had not made good her claim to the
 provinces of New York and Jersey, would not
 the Dutch and Swedes have been in possession
 of them? Are they greater friends to liberty
 than the English? And would not the French
 and Spaniards from Canada, and the Floridas,
 if England had not interfered, have soon
 reduced both the now-all-powerful provinces
 of the north, and those of the south to
 despotic obedience, and before this, have
 learned them to implicitly obey—not the *mild restrictions*
 of a Parent-state, but the *will of absolute monarchs*?

Their ancestors settled under cover of the
 claim of England to these territories, and
 their descendants to this time have been
 protected there by her power. They therefore
 cannot look upon themselves but as holding
 their country or lands under certain tenures,
 somewhat similar to copyholders, and have,
 like them, if they dislike the tenure they hold
 under, a right to quit the premises, but not to
 hold them without compliance with the terms.
 But this they regard not, nor even the stipu-
 lations of their predecessors; for the writers in
 favour of American sedition say, “Children

“ or

“or successors are not bound by any acts of their parents or predecessors;” which they illustrate thus: “If a parent should bind himself and descendants for ever, for slaves, are they bound by that engagement?” Certainly not. The conclusion is so far just, but has nothing to do with the point in question; which is, if an individual, or body of men, should accept of lands, or other permanent possessions, to be held by them and their heirs or successors, under certain stipulated conditions; are the successors entitled to the lands without performing the stipulations of their ancestors? Or should they not in this case, revert to the successors of the granters?

Perhaps the friends of American opposition will say, it is similar to the case quoted by them, and that the successors are no ways bound to perform the covenants of their fathers, because they think them unreasonable.

We will now put the case a little nearer to them, and see whether their sentiments would not change.

Suppose these friends of America have left to them certain quit rents of lands, granted by their ancestors, to the predecessors of the present occupiers, and these occupiers tell them, when demanded to perform the stipulations of their said predecessors, that they have no idea of performing these covenants, because made before they were born, consequently without their consent; besides, that

no man had a right to covenant for them, and they will therefore hold their lands without rendering any acknowledgment. In this instance, would not the friends of America say, the occupiers of, or residents on, the land, ought to perform the covenants of their predecessors, or entirely give up the premises? They most certainly would, for here their interest would not let them pervert their reason.

Many of the Americans, and some of their friends in England, were willing to allow a power to the king as an individual, which they will not admit him when he considers himself as a part of the legislative power of the imperial state. Besides the incongruity of this doctrine, it would be enabling the king, by rendering the different states of the empire independent of each other, any farther than being connected under the same sovereign, to raise supplies in, and wage war with one of his dependent territories or kingdoms against another, or perhaps against the imperial state, and in the end, bring them all to an entire dependence on his will.

Now setting aside the right of England, according to the laws and customs of civilized nations, to the property of the lands, which right, as well as that of the aborigines, the native Indians, (which government is intitled to from purchase of them) is a claim superior to that of the Americans; the Colonies ought
to

to have been attached to her, from the principle of their own interest; for although England confines them, if they do purchase manufactures, &c. to purchase of her, she in return gives, besides her protection, the greatest encouragement to all their produce:—Instance—indigo, hemp, flax, raw silk, pot-ashes, staves, tar, turpentine, pitch, masts, yards, and bowsprits, fir timber, and deals, (few of which she will receive from other states without considerable duties) she encouraged from America by great bounties.

Now all or most of these are raw materials, which, if she could even produce herself, it would be her interest to import them from Russia or elsewhere, provided she came by them much cheaper, because they are the basis of many manufactures, whose price must consequently be lessened, and consumption and exportation increased; therefore employment to a greater number of hands, resulting from her purchasing those raw materials, it becomes her interest to do so. Hence it plainly appears England, in some instances, prefers the interest of her Colonies to her own.

Most branches of commerce in their infancy require some encouragement, if they have to contend with rival articles long established:—It therefore was good policy in this country to give a bounty on hemp, tar, pot-ash, &c. from America, both to render us less dependent on Russia, Sweden, and Germany, and to reduce,

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by the greater plenty and competition, the price of those articles; but when the end is answered it should cease, or there should then at the most be only as much difference * in favour of American produce, as is equal to the advantage reaped by the manufactures with which we buy it, even supposing the same articles from other countries to be purchased entirely with specie or bullion.

* That is, the amount of the bounty on the article from America, and duty, if any, on the import from elsewhere.

S E C T I O N VII.

Better to render the New England Colonies independent, than keep them on their former footing: The advantages and inconveniencies of it considered.

SHOULD the New England Colonies, from their great concerns in shipping and fisheries, be unwilling to yield the Mother-country, besides the power of external taxation, the sole navigation of the whole empire (except as before provided) it would be infinitely better to part with, and allow them independency, than admit their allegiance on other terms.

The consequence of parting with these Colonies, from which we draw no staple commodities, can never be of essential detriment to this country; for it is not to be supposed their commercial connexions with us would immediately cease, if ever they do so; because in many articles they would find it their advantage to deal with us, being cheaper supplied than they could elsewhere.

But supposing the worst, that out of disaffection and inveteracy to the Parent-state, they should resolve to purchase nothing of her; the loss attending this will admit of no comparison with what we suffer from their rivalry in the Newfoundland and northern fishery,

fishery, and interference in the carrying trade of the southern Colonies.

Now let us view the consequence to themselves of their becoming independent :

In the first place, they will lose all their fishery on the banks of Newfoundland, Nova-Scotia, and Labrador, with the carriage of these fish to market, and their share of supplying the residents on the 'land, and the fishermen and shipping from Ireland and England with flour and provisions. All of which are great sources of riches to themselves, and of employment to a vast number of their sailors.

2dly, They will certainly lose the supplying of the British West Indies with lumber and provisions, because that will be done from our other Colonies, and the Mother-country.

3dly, Their carrying trade for the southern Colonies must cease of course. And

Lastly, As a further aggravation to all this loss of commerce, their taxes, which have hitherto not been felt, will become very perceptible ; and the more so, as their commerce, which would have raised a considerable part of them, will be diminished.

To maintain their independency, and give them weight in the political scale, a naval and military power will be required ; and to maintain these, considerable sums must be raised. Besides, it is highly probable their civil and executive establishments will become more expensive,

penfive, as they will affume a greater degree of splendour than when dependent on another ftate.

As their independency will occafion a confiderable lofs of trade, and vaft increafe of taxes, we may venture to fay ten-fold, it will follow, that both individuals and the community at large will feel thefe ill effects, and the natural confequence will be a confiderable emigration to thofe Colonies ftill in allegiance to the Parent-ftate, where they may live unburthened with the weight of internal taxes, and confequently be enabled to fell the produce of their induftry to more advantage.

It may perhaps be urged, that however unfavourable this picture is of Northern-colony independency, the ftate of thofe Colonies would be little better, fhould they, by accepting the propofed mode of allegiance, give up the major part of their navigation, or active commerce by fea. To me it appears the latter alternative would be the more eligible of the two; for although they would lofe the advantage of carrying their own articles to Europe, &c. they would not the profit of raifing and felling them, and the eafe of being free from any heavy internal tax. Befides, as the lofs of the greateft part of their navigation would turn their minds to manufactures for their own confumption, it would become neceffary for this kingdom to give them due advantages to divert their attention from them.

The

The great staples of the southern Colonies, from the profit attending them, being superior to either manufactures or navigation, solely occupy the industry of the inhabitants, and will continue to do so until people become more plentiful than land; the result of which will be a gradual decrease in the price of labour, till wages become nearly the same as in the manufacturing countries in Europe. Then, and not till then, whilst the Colonies remain dependent, can manufactures flourish, (unless in bulky articles) because they can be had cheaper from the parent state, and even at this period, by proper policy, the Colony manufactures may be greatly retarded.

The foundation of all manufactures are raw materials, which either are produced at home or abroad; if the former, Britain may enhance the price by bounties on exportation to herself, equal or superior to the freight both ways, so as to enable her manufacturers to supply the Colonies as cheap as they could make them: Or if the manufactures be from foreign raw materials, she may prevent them, by heavy duties on the entry, or an absolute prohibition.

The northern Colonies are now arrived at that degree of population which renders manufactures * and the culture of land near equally

* Some houses in Philadelphia and New-York had, before the breaking out of the present troubles, agents over here to endeavour to procure workmen, who understood the crown glass manufactory, to set forward and carry on this fabric in America.

advantageous, and their entering into the former would render them of little service as Colonies; therefore, as observed before, it would demand our immediate attention to turn their minds from this, or such part of it, as would interfere with England, by procuring them some equally or more beneficial employment. The only produce of their cultivated lands that we do not raise is flax-seed, which is consumed in Ireland and Scotland in great quantities for sowing, and might, with due encouragement, be imported in large quantities to England, for crushing or making oil, in the place of the many cargoes we import from Russia, Germany, France and Italy for that purpose. There is therefore room to give them additional employment in the raising of this article.

Pot-ash is another article or staple, not interfering with us, that we might encourage to a superior degree, so as to lessen the importation of it from Germany, by the means of greater bounties * on the one, or heavier duties † on the other.

Fir timber is an article we are in want of, but that cannot, from its being a commodity of great bulk in proportion to its value, be

* On the propriety and extent of bounties, see the conclusion of the last section.

† It is seldom expedient to encrease the duties on foreign articles, for fear the state they come from should, in return, raise the charges on their import of our own produce or manufactures.

ever made to answer to any great extent. It will do best to Ireland and the west part of this kingdom, because, the freight from America is lower, and proportionably higher from the Baltic, than to the ports on the east side.

As timber for ship-building is so scarce with us, it might be necessary to permit them to build ships for exportation or for sale, (manned with British seamen) as it would be a means of enabling us by being supplied with shipping cheaper than we otherwise should be, to rival more successfully the other European States, but how far it would be proper to suffer them to be sold to foreigners, is a point not so easily determined.

In favour of it it may be urged, that disposing of shipping as a Colony produce, is the same as selling to other powers, pot ashes or indigo, from the same places, and consequently a means of bringing the ballance of trade so much more in our favour, and encreasing our relative riches.

On the other hand it may be asserted, that by selling ships to our rivals cheaper than they otherwise could come by them, which is the only inducement and reason they can have for buying them, we enable them more effectually to rival and undermine us in our sea-commerce, by furnishing them the means of carrying it on with less capital, or the hire of less money (in interest and insurance) which

is

is the same as if we enabled them to do it with proportionate less wages or hire of seamen.

Besides, by raising a greater competition of buyers, we should probably enhance to ourselves, the price of this foundation of all sea-commerce; and therefore, in a duplicate degree, deprive ourselves, by the selling of ships to foreigners, of the superior advantages we should otherwise have over them in the cheapness of navigation, which, if enjoyed, would enable us to supply foreigners with the gross products of our own or other countries, cheaper than any other state could.

If we had it in our power, and were to supply foreigners with ships much lower than they could either build them or buy them elsewhere, then, indeed, the consequence would be more detrimental, than the advantage we could reap from selling a product of our Colonies—But if the difference be, what we have reason to believe it is, no way considerable, then the advantage will lay on our side, and particularly so, if the ropes and sail-cloth be manufactured in Britain, for then we should not only dispose of our Colony produce, but a considerable quantity of our own manufactures.

Before the present troubles, the Colony-built vessels, were equipped with sails made of British canvas, and principally with British cordage; and if these differences are closed on the

proposed basis, it will be in our power to have it so again.

Here it may not be improper to notice, that for some time past, our exportation of cordage, to the northern Colonies in particular, had greatly decreased, occasioned by the ceasing to allow the drawback of the duty of the hemp, on the export of it in cordage—From the same cause, we are deprived in a great measure, of supplying the Cape de Verds, Madeira, the Canaries, &c. with considerable quantities of that manufacture.

Hemp from Russia, &c. pays a duty of 3s. $2\frac{6}{8}$ d. per cwt. and cordage manufactured of this hemp, on its export * was entitled to a drawback of 2s. $4\frac{1}{4}$ d. per cwt. which was, and still continues to be highly necessary, to give due encouragement to the export of that manufacture.

Spain annually receives from Russia, considerable quantities of cordage, which Britain might afford to send her, was the duty on the raw material, as good policy requires, drawn back.

I have now endeavoured to point out the mutually advantageous connections there might be between us and the Colonies, and that it would be the interest of even the New England provinces to accede to the proposed system, rather than become independent : Likewise

* By an act of 6 Geo. III. which expired in the 12 Geo. III.
that

that we are interested to accept of their allegiance on no other terms. It even appears a matter of doubt, whether it would be advisable to accept of their allegiance at all, because from their turbulent and seditious spirit, they would sooner or later occasion, as they have done now, an insurrection of the continent, either with or without the least provocation on our part.—Were they but independent, an antipathy would soon subsist between them and the other Colonies; as they would then look on each other as separate people, possessed of different interests.

However it will no doubt be contended, that the independency of these provinces will greatly affect our West India possessions, by the loss of their consumption of molasses and rum. This loss will not be so considerable as may be imagined, because these Colonies have all along, by illicit practices, consumed much greater quantities of French * Island molasses and rum, under cover of its being from our own islands, than can well be imagined. Their inducement was its cheapness in the French Islands, owing to France laying great restrictions on their rum, because it would interfere with brandy, her own produce.

* In 1763 was imported into Massachusetts Bay 15,000 hogheads of molasses, all of which, except less than 500, came from ports that are foreign. The value of these, at 1s. 4d. a gallon, a medium price, is £. 100,000.

Governor Barnard's Letter.

In peace they effect the free introduction of those articles, partly by the negligence or indulgence of their own revenue officers, particularly in the article of molasses, for if the duty of 3 d.* a gallon had been fully collected, it would have amounted almost to a prohibition, from its being at least 25 per cent. on the original cost, when the same article, the produce of our own islands, was imported duty-free. If it had been two-thirds or one-half the amount, it might have bore putting strictly in execution, and would have raised a considerable revenue. It would not be our interest to prohibit these articles from the foreign islands, because it would put a stop to our Northern-colony exports to them, and prevent a proportional demand of articles from Britain; though at the same time it is adviseable to lay on as heavy a duty as the foreign molasses would well bear, that the planters in our own islands, by obtaining a greater price for these articles, may be able, as much as possible, to undersell foreigners in sugar, the principal object. The northern Colonists purchase more in the French Islands than the value of their exports thither, and pay for the deficiency with the specie they have received for the sale of lumber, &c. at our own.

* By 4 Geo. III. chap. 15, the duty on foreign molasses and syrups was reduced to 3 d. per gallon, to take place from and after the 29th of September, 1764. Previous to that period, it was, by 6 Geo. II. chap. 13. 6 d. a gallon.

In time of war with France they contrive to carry on the trade in French rum and molasses, under cover of pretended captures, cartel ships, &c.

But even supposing that British island rum and molasses are consumed in such considerable quantities in the New England Provinces, that the loss of it would be sensibly felt; our southern Colonies, from having a greater sale for their lumber by as much as went before from New England, would take a greater quantity of rum and molasses in return; and if this be not sufficient, due encouragement might be given, by lessening in the Mother-country the duty on rum, or encreasing that on brandy and geneva: the latter of which might be more adviseable, as it would not enable the lower class of people to indulge themselves to their own detriment, more than they do in the pernicious practice of drinking spirits.

From what has been already advanced, it will appear, there will be little chance the New England Colonies (New Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay, Rhode Island, and Connecticut) becoming so powerful in consequence of their independence, should that take place, as to endanger the safety of the rest of our possessions. Their utmost limits should be confined to their present bounds; then they will be so perfectly surrounded by us, and so good a communication afforded by Hudson's River,
the

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the Lakes Sacrament and Champlain, the Rivers Sorel, St. Lawrence, St. Croix, Kennebec, and the sea, that they might, in case of war, be attacked from all quarters.

Besides, these Colonies having no communication themselves with the lakes, can never interfere with us in the fur and peltry trade, which, next to the fisheries, is the most essential benefit we can reap from northern settlements.

S E C T I O N VIII.

Independency of the British American Colonies, contrary to the interest of the European maritime powers. Consequence of this independency to Britain, and the rest of Europe. Interest of Britain rather than lose the whole, to divide part of her American provinces with some of the maritime states of Europe.

WE have already viewed the consequences of the independency of the New England Provinces, both to themselves and the Mother-country, the effect of which, to the latter, is of little moment.—But now we will suppose the general independency of the whole British Colonies, and a *perfect union* amongst them. Should these take place, it would not be an event so desirable in Europe, even by our rivals, as politicians may in general imagine.

To view it in its worst light to us, let us suppose it followed by an immediate French and Spanish war.

It will be said, that we cannot, after having exhausted the power of the nation, and lost so considerable a branch of our trade, which bore a proportionate part of our taxes, be able to raise the extra supplies for the war.

Possibly we might not; but what would be the consequence? A general bankruptcy of the state. This would ruin many individuals of

M

these

these kingdoms, and at the same time, as great part of the debt is due to foreigners, would have as deplorable consequences in other countries. This calamity ought, in justice and equity, to be avoided; but necessity has no law, and therefore the inconvenience must be dispensed with, the same as it has been oftener than once in France. Let us see its national consequences on the other side. We save an annual payment to the national creditors of £.4,464,071, and apply this great sum to the purpose of the war, which will be quite, or almost equal to the extra expences, above the peace establishment, and thereby relieve the people from any further burthens: But should this saving be not sufficient, it is only having recourse to that excellent method laid down by Postlethwaite in his *Great Britain's True System* on the raising the supplies within the year, which he shews might always have been done without effecting the labouring class, and without further funding, by laying certain Poll Taxes on those superior ranks * of the people that are able to bear them.

The

* Mr Postlethwaite supposed the number of subjects able to bear Poll Taxes to be in the following classes and proportions, viz.

1	Temporal Lords	—	—	—	250
2	Spiritual Lords	—	—	—	26
3	Baronets, Knights, and Esquires	—	—	—	4,500
4	Gentlemen	—	—	—	14,000
5	Persons in great offices	—	—	—	6,000
6	Ditto in lesser ditto	—	—	—	9,000
					7 Eminent

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The whole export trade to all our American Continental Colonies *, is only estimated at £3,097,500 per annum; therefore supposing it would flow there by no other channels, and that it was all profit, it would not be equal to the advantage derived from the non-payment of £4,464,071, the annual interest of the national debt.

7	Eminent Merchants and Traders, Monied } Men and Bankers	3,000
8	Lesser ditto — — —	12,000
9	Law, and its superior Dependents —	15,000
10	Eminent Clergymen — — —	2,000
11	Lesser ditto — — —	12,000
12	Freeholders of better fort — —	30,000
13	Ditto lesser — — —	125,000
14	Farmers — — —	180,000
15	Persons in liberal arts, and Physicians, } Chymists, &c.	30,000
16	Shopkeepers and Tradesmen —	100,000
17	Artificers and Handicrafts — —	80,000
18	Officers of the Navy, Captains of India- } men, and other principal Ships	10,000
19	Military Officers — — —	7,000
		639,776

Brokers, Agents, &c. &c. he supposes will make, with the above, one million; each division to be taxed according to what be deemed equal to the abilities of that rank, but upon the whole, to average £.3 or 4 as exigencies may require; and this, for the greater ease of payment, to be collected monthly.

If this be not sufficient, he advises a tax on saddle horses, &c. to this we may add, as equal articles of luxury, a tax on livery servants, dogs, public places of diversion, &c. the whole of which might be collected without creating any new officers, after the same manner, and for the same allowances, (6d. in the pound) as the Land-tax.

* Hudson's Bay included, viz. £.16,000.

The non-payment of the national debt, or public failure, may be looked upon as a political evil by some; because, say they, in case of great emergency, the public faith will be lost. This we have little reason to think; for did not Lewis XV. borrow or fund money upon better terms than even his predecessor did, although there had been a general failure of the national debt contracted by Lewis XIV? This is not to be wondered at, for certainly there is a greater probability of a nation's being able to pay a small debt, than ever to discharge a large one, especially when it still continues funding, till in the end the interest must swallow up the national revenue, and cease to be paid of course.—Thus ultimately must the debt be discharged.

However, supposing the credit of the nation to be entirely or in a great measure lost, the consequence would rather be advantageous, for then we should be always obliged to raise the supplies, or most of them, within the year, which, by the means afore-mentioned, is not impracticable, and would not only, if it took place, prevent in future the subject being oppressed by too heavy taxes, but in a great measure destroy the influence of any ministry that might wish to corrupt the people, or their representatives. A further result from the ease of taxes would be, our manufactures would encrease, from a greater demand being occasioned by our affording them cheaper through the consequent decrease of wages.

We

We have now shewn the worst consequences to ourselves, from the loss or independence of America, would be an abolition of the national debt, which, though a loss to individuals, would be a great national advantage: What we have further to consider is, the consequence to the rest of Europe.

In all probability one of the first would be South America, as well as the Spanish northern settlements, which in a considerable degree groan under European servitude, would, for real evils, follow the example the north-eastern parts have set them, though only actuated by imaginary ones: And Spain and Portugal, who would lose the most, as likewise France and Holland, would find it very difficult, or even impossible, if the supposed independent British Colonies, or Britain herself out of revenge, should assist the insurgents either privately or avowedly, to bring them again to their state of dependence.

The American continent once independent, the European states, we may fear, would find it impossible to hold their possessions in the West Indies; and when stript of these, with a consequent part of their maritime power, which would be not only a loss to them, but so much increase to that of the American states, they might even dare to insult the coasts of Europe with impunity, and, if not entirely reverse the tables, by establishing garrisons on our continent, or in the British Isles, might possess
them-

themselves of the European settlements in the East Indies, and consequently remove the seat of empire and of arts across the Atlantic. This idea will not be visionary, but only somewhat farther distant, though not less certain, supposing the Colonies of the Spaniards, &c. not to revolt, because from the situation and climate of the British Colonies, with the great increase of manufactures and population consequent of their becoming independent, they would be so powerful and sensible of it, that they would not long resist their inclinations to invade Mexico and Chili, and they, with the other provinces, would in the end fall before them, as the southern states of Europe formerly did to the Goths and Vandals of the North.

Therefore, it appears, the interest of all the maritime states, or of Europe in general, not to suffer the independency of our American Colonies; but as the advantage of keeping them, more immediately results to Britain than to the other European states, they might not, even in case of necessity, be inclined to lend her any active assistance, without which, all efforts might be vain. In this case it would be prudent, rather to save a part only, than lose the whole. This dilemma, it is improbable we shall be reduced to, but should we be at that unfortunate pass, then to save our southern or staple Colonies, the most valuable to us, we might return to the Dutch,
their

their New Netherlands, or province of New York; to the Swedes, their antient possessions of New Jersey; and to the French, restore Canada.—Thus the New England Colonies surrounded by other states, and cut off from the southern provinces, could bring about no insurrections in them, and be themselves the more easily kept in due allegiance to the Parent-state, so as to render them a possession worth keeping; but should dire necessity require it, we might give up our claim to them to other states, in consequence of their assistance, to recover to ourselves the southern provinces.

With these, and our northern possessions of Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, Labrador, and Hudson's Bay*, all which afford considerable fisheries, and the two latter a trade with the Indians for furs†, which might, if laid open, be greatly increased, so as perhaps to equal our present supplies from Canada, and from Albany and Oswego.

* At present a considerable number of whales are yearly caught in Hudson's Bay, by the Esquimaux, and was the navigation not restrained by the exclusive charter to the Hudson's Bay company, a very valuable whale and seal fishery might be carried on by private adventurers.

† Hudson's Bay exports, in skins, with a small quantity of feathers, some whale bone, and a few tons of oil, amount to £. 29,340. Its imports (of nearly the same articles as Newfoundland) are valued at £. 16,000. And the company employ, besides a few schooners and small vessels in the Bay, 4 ships, manned with about 130 men, in their trade to and from London.

From

From this disposition of our northern Colonies to other states, or, in general, restoration of them to their former European possessors, we should not have much to fear, because, though they might collectively be able to overpower the southern Colonies reserved to ourselves, yet from the different states they belonged to, this would be little to be dreaded, and any of them separately would be no match to contend with.

S E C T I O N IX.

On improvements at home—*Union with Ireland*
 — *Advantages of it considered—British isles,*
their fisheries capable of great improvement—The
means that will effect it—Measures for the
easier manning of the navy—Ill execution of the
revenue laws in Scotland—Revision of poor laws.

IT more immediately concerns a kingdom to cherish the interests of any islands or states of limited extent, dependent upon it, than its Colonies, settled in provinces of almost unlimited extent, on a great continent; because her possession of, or alliance with the latter, can only be temporary, and from the nature of things must sooner or later cease; which, period, even at the latest, will be when the extended country becomes so populous as to afford such a surplus of inhabitants, over what are wanted for agriculture, as to occasion the people to assemble in towns for commercial purposes; because they will then find their power, and soon be inclined to use it, if they think they lay under any restraint, which, whether just or no, the gross of the people may easily be made to think is real, by those turbulent spirits, whose interests or passions may induce them to promote sedition.

Let us now enquire, whether we have improved, to the utmost advantage, those islands that are dependent on Britain.

N

Ireland

Ireland first presents itself to view—A kingdom, looked on by our legislature, in most instances, as a foreign power, rather than one so nearly allied; restrained in her commerce and manufactures, yet ready to bear a great share of our burthens.

We have indeed encouraged her linen-manufactures, and of late been so kind as to give a bounty on the importation of flax-seed, from some parts of Europe, to sow her lands, since they have been deprived of this article from America. Some other recent instances of British kindness might likewise be mentioned. But what will most effectually answer the end, will be to allow Ireland the same commercial privileges with ourselves. This they cannot reasonably expect, without bearing equal portions of the public burthen with ourselves, and that cannot be exactly determined, without the same revenue laws take place in each kingdom, which it follows must be passed by one and the same legislature, therefore to effect this, a union is obviously necessary.

Let us now consider the effects in either island, and what objections they can have against it.

The people of Ireland may object to an union, because they may be higher taxed. Upon consideration, they will find this have no weight, because a majority of the Irish parliament are ever ready to answer the minister's demands.

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A capital objection lays from the city of Dublin, and landholders in its vicinity, from the seat of government being removed. This loss to them would be only temporary, and none in the long run. Has the city of Edinburgh decreased, or has it not rather increased since the throne was removed? Might not the same be expected of Dublin?

The inhabitants of Ireland are estimated only to be two millions and a half, although it is evident from its great export of provisions, and from the great quantity of lands yet in a bad state of culture, and other parts not cultivated at all, that twice the number, or five millions might be maintained in the kingdom, without having recourse elsewhere, for the necessaries of life.—A kingdom, in which the ballance of trade in manufactures, exclusive of native produce, is equal, may have such a degree of population, as will consume the whole produce of its lands. But when its exports of manufactures exceed its imports of foreign articles, a territory may then maintain in proportion to this excess, many times the number of inhabitants its produce will support, as we see exemplified in Holland—Now, we know the Irish are restrained in their export of woollen manufactures, and that, besides the wool (and woollen yarn) the English take from them, they supply the French in contraband trade, with great quantities; therefore the consequence of non-re-

straint would be, they would manufacture their wool themselves: This would occasion a demand for more manufacturers: That, and the cheapness of provisions, would bring them from foreign countries, and prevent the emigration of the Irish to France and Spain * for want of employment at home.

This would increase the number of subjects and commerce of the kingdom, and at the same time, prevent our rivals being supplied with wool, or at least occasion them to receive it in less quantities, and at an advanced rate, which would enhance the price of their manufactures, and destroy their competition.

No country in the world is better situated for trade than Ireland, from the excellency and number of its ports, therefore, what but restraint can prevent it from flourishing.

The increase of inhabitants from these consequences, would occasion a home consumption for every article the land produces or maintains, and consequently increase the value to its possessors; and whilst most other towns were increasing in population, value of lands, manufactures and commerce, the city of Dublin could not go without her increase of the

* To recruit the Irish Brigades in the French and Spanish service, frequently employed against ourselves—A union and perfect freedom of trade, besides preventing this ill effect, would so attach the Irish to this government, as to take away all necessity of keeping an armed force in that country to prevent insurrections, and obviate every fear of their assisting the Spaniards, in case of an invasion.

two latter, which would compensate for the loss of the residence of the Vice-Roy.

From England being the seat of the executive and legislative powers of the empire, which must always draw a confluence of men of great estates to spend their incomes there, it may be said Ireland will be less able to bear her share of the public taxes; but will not the same argument hold in favour of Westmoreland, Cumberland, and all the distant counties in England, which reap no more benefit than Ireland, from the confluence of riches in London?

Number of inhabitants are of more moment than extent of territory, because they increase the field of taxation and real strength; and the more connected that strength, the better will it be able to act, and the more capable of great efforts. Thus if by any means we can increase the number of subjects in the British isles, it would certainly compensate for the loss of them in America.

The most material objection England can have against a perfect union with Ireland, will arise from the towns and counties engaged in the woollen manufacture, because of the rivalry of the Irish; but is it not better the Irish should rival us than the French; for would not the Irish, when united to us, be the same to the state as the people of any particular town or county in England? Besides, the Irish increase of trade in the woollen manufacture

facture could not arise from any material diminution of our own, but from that of the French, who get the principal part of their surplus of wool.

At present we may suppose none of their wool is thrown away, but either manufactured by themselves or the French (except the little that comes to England); therefore, considering our English manufacturers as individuals abstract from the state, what matters it to them whether the Irish wool be wrought by themselves, or any other people who go to the same market, since it is evident that for sometime at least no more wool can be manufactured than before; therefore the rivalry will be the same, and when we consider the French cannot make many of their stuffs to perfection without a considerable mixture of English or Irish wool, it will follow, that the Irish, working all their wool themselves, will give an advantage to the English manufacturers they had not before; and even when the breed of sheep in Ireland is increased, so as to afford a larger quantity of wool, the Irish can have no advantage over the British manufacturers, but what may arise from the cheapness of labour. The rate of this we have shewn principally depends on the price of provisions, and that by following such measures as are laid down in the 4th Section, provisions and labour might be as low in England as in any manufacturing country
what-

whatsoever; and that the English, so far from fearing a decrease, might expect an increase in every manufacture. What advantage the Irish might at first have in the price of provisions, would be counterbalanced by their number of manufacturers being unequal to their increased demand, which, during this scarcity, would advance the rate of labour until a sufficient number were bred up to the business, or manufacturers from other countries induced to go over by the highness of wages and cheapness of provisions. At this period, when they have manufacturers sufficient, *and provisions uniformly low, from the free export and import*, the price of labour would lower.

From the increase of trade and population in Ireland, the taxes and burthens of the state would be more divided, and might consequently fall the lighter on Britain, to the advantage of her landed interest, manufacturers, and every other class of individuals; therefore so far from the prosperity of Ireland being to be feared, it is an event ardently to be desired by every inhabitant of this country.

Now as to the smaller British Isles, the Isle of Man,* the Hebrides, Orcades, and Shetland,† the principal improvement they will admit

* The Isles of Wight, Sheppey, &c. affording nothing peculiar from their situations, need no particular discussion.

† The fishery of the Isle of Man is for herrings, which they have greatly improved since the sovereignty of that island

admit of, is an increase of their fisheries, which, notwithstanding the encouragement the legislature has given, are far from being in that state of perfection they will admit of.

The principal reason that appears for their not being so, and for the Dutch, upon our own coasts, almost from the Firth of Forth all the way to the north of Shetland, carrying it on so advantageously, and without any bounty, is not their superior knowledge in the curing of the fish, which could not long be peculiar to them, but only the lowness of their sailors' wages, and their provisions, and the high rates of those with us, the difference

island has been purchased by government, being in some measure obliged to turn their attention to it by the loss of their smuggling trade. The Hebrides, or the western isles of Scotland, at the proper seasons, abound with herring, cod, and ling. The herrings in some years have come into their lochs or bays in such shoals that they have been sold for 6d. per barrel, and for want of casks or salt have been frequently used as manure for their lands. Charles I. greatly encouraged the fishery in these parts, but the civil wars destroyed the good effects that might have been expected.

Charles II. greatly promoted for some time, the western island fishery, having himself a great share in a company associated for that purpose. They established stores of salt, casks, &c. at Loch Maddie, in the isle of North Uist, and might have gone on successfully, had not the necessities of that luxurious monarch occasioned him to withdraw his share of stock, which brought on the dissolution of the company.

The fisheries of Shetland are for ling, cod, and tusk. Those of the Orkneys are the same, but at present very inconsiderable.

Brassay Sound, in Shetland, is the rendezvous for the herring busses; they begin their fishery on the 24th of June, and keep with the shoals of herrings as they move southward.

being

being at least twenty or thirty per cent.—full sufficient to give almost the monopoly to the Dutch.

The wages of sailors, as their food, when employed, is always found them, do not seem dependent on the price of provisions; but if we consider the subject, we shall find, that when, from the uniform lowness of provisions, the rates of all labour on shore are reduced, the rate of wages at sea cannot, as now, remain from twenty to fifty per cent. higher than in all other nations; because these classes of the people that must labour, and have professions to chuse of, would certainly prefer in general, that which gave the greatest encouragement; this preference would create great plenty of sailors, and occasion wages to lower from the number wanting employment, which they could nevertheless procure no where to greater advantage, until the wages of seamen, in the commerce of these kingdoms, fell below those of other nations, of which there is little probability. The hire of fishermen on the coast, will be lowered by the same causes, which will likewise occasion those, who fish in their own boats, to sell their produce for less.

When wages and provisions, through the result of a *free import and export*, shall have fallen here as low as in Holland, shall we not be able to carry on the fisheries *on our own coasts* to as much advantage as the Dutch?

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Cer-

Certainly we shall, and even more so, from our situation on the spot.

We have an undoubted right to preserve those fisheries to ourselves; but from the commercial advantages we reap from the Dutch, they are in some degree entitled to a share in the eastern Scottish * fishery, the possession of which amply repays them. The men employed by Holland in the Scottish and English† fisheries, and in carrying the produce to market, are computed to be 200,000; besides these, about one-fourth as many are, in consequence of these fisheries, employed on shore, in the building of ships, making nets, curing the fish, &c. &c.

Therefore, supposing us only to come in for one-half of what the Dutch enjoy, we shall gain, besides employment to upwards of 12,000 artificers, an accession of 100,000 seamen, two-thirds of which would be always on our coasts, ready to man our fleets on every emergency. A most noble resource!

This shews, in the strongest manner, the *absolute necessity there is for the free import and export of grain and provisions*‡; because, from this only can provisions and wages become lower, and upon the lowness of these depends the accession of the riches and power attendant on extensive fisheries.

* For ling, cod, tusk, and herrings.

† Yarmouth, &c. for herrings.

‡ Cattle, salt provisions, &c.

The same causes will produce the same effects in the English* and Irish fisheries †, so as to enable them to contribute their share to the grandeur and increase of the British maritime power.

A nation possessed of numerous seamen, one would suppose could seldom be in want of them to man its navy. Yet we find that in England, we are generally obliged to have recourse to the arbitrary and expensive method of impressing. The chief probable causes why men do not enter, are the uncertainty when, if ever, they may be discharged; and the knowledge of the great increase of wages in the merchant service, always consequent on the breaking out of a press, and during the want of men for the navy. These causes Lieut. Thomlinson, in his excellent plan (which it is supposed will shortly come under the consideration of the legislature) has greatly obviated; but there is one (if I rightly remember) he has not touched on, which has as much weight as any of the rest, viz. the unequal distribution of prize-money; one-fourth only falling to the share of the sailors and marines. Small as this share is, we find the sailors always wishing for, and ready to enter in a Spanish war, because of the probability of rich prizes: Therefore it is

* Coast of Cornwall and Devonshire for pilchards, and that of Norfolk, &c. for herrings.

† Herrings on the north-west coast, and other parts.

obvious, that were the failors' share doubled, they would as ardently enter to serve against an enemy that might afford half the amount of rich prizes they could have reason to expect from the Spaniards, and this they might hope for in a war with almost any other power.

As to the subdivision of prize-money among the officers, this, though not perhaps the most equitable, we shall not now contend about, but suppose it to continue the same—Therefore, as the three-fourths of the whole prize-money, which is what falls to the share of the officers, is subdivided in 6 parts, (viz. $\frac{1}{6}$ *) they might still hold the same proportion to each other by calling them $\frac{1}{12}$, thus the failors would come in for one-half, which, on account of the great disproportion in number between them and the officers, can never be deemed unreasonable, but if it be, let us compromise the difference, and call the failors' quota only $\frac{1}{10}$.

Many officers urge that the failors have already too great a share, because they only waste what they now get, and if they had more it would go the same way—I don't doubt many of the officers do the same, there-

* Admiral	—	—	—	—	1
Captain	—	—	—	—	2
Lieutenants, master, captain of marines, &c.					1
Boatswain, carpenter, gunner, &c.	—				1
Petty officers	—	—	—	—	1
					6

If a cruising ship, the captain has then three-eighths (his own and the admiral's) or *once and a half as much as all the failors and marines.*

fore

fore the argument will hold against their getting so much as they do.

Few sailors indeed save what they get, but this matters not to the public, as long as the sailor's getting and spending this money is a great inducement to his defending his country.

We may without any hesitation assert, that sailors would be readily induced to enter into the navy by this increase of prize-money, were it joined to a limited time of service, and the imposition of a heavy penalty on both the paying and receiving of more wages in the merchant service, (either party informing to be exempted) than 40 or 45s. or at most 50s. per month, and in proportionate rates for coasting voyages.

This would take away the great difference betwixt the merchants' and government's pay, and yet being greatly more than the pay of other nations, would be sufficient to induce foreigners to come into our merchants' service.

That this last regulation is highly necessary, will appear, when we are told, that in the breaking out of the present press*, the sailors in the coal trade, from Newcastle to London and back, notwithstanding the ships had protections, demanded and would not sail without six guineas wages, and as this voyage seldom exceeds a month, how can it be expected that the present bounty of five guineas, high as it is, or even twice that sum, would induce

* October and November, 1776.

these

these men to enter on board men of war, to receive 22s. 6d. per month*.

One cause that occasions, among the best seamen especially, an aversion to the navy is, their being liable, with or without cause, to be beat and ill used by those frequently their inferiors in the knowledge of their duty, the petty officers†.

We will now return to our principal subject from which we have digressed.

We have already mentioned how liberal the Irish are in the sums raised for public use. The state indeed reaps little benefit, but the misapplication of these sums cannot be laid to their charge, as they might all be applied to the good of the public, and we may hope will be, should a union take place between that country and Great Britain.

* In the navy, 13 months are accounted to a year, so that 22s. 6d. per month only, with the allowance of provisions, is far better pay than that of the soldiers, and not to be complained of.

† Besides these measures for manning the navy, without having recourse to impressing, there is another that was once tried with success—a voluntary register of seamen, that is, to allow to 40 or 50 thousand seamen (or the number that may be thought necessary) an annual pay of 40 or 50s. or even £. 3 on these seamen, registering and engaging to hold themselves ready on certain notice, to serve on board the navy. This would be no great national expence, and perhaps no greater during a whole peace, than the charges of impressing during war.

In the reign of William III. this method was at one time followed, and a sufficient number registered themselves voluntarily; but the contract was broke on the part of government, by the non-payment of these honest men.

The

The money raised in Britain by taxes, with the charges of collection, are calculated by Doctor Price at near twelve millions, a very considerable sum, and more so, when we consider that England pays nearly the whole of it. Many readers will be surprized when they are told the whole excises of Scotland, at a medium of three years, ending in 1773, produced only £. 95,229*, and that the whole customs of that kingdom amounted to no more than £. 68,369. Fraud and collusion evidently appear on the face of this, and one need not fear to exceed the truth in saying, the duties at Glasgow only, if fully collected†, would amount to more than is now paid by the whole kingdom. That the excises are collected in the same collusive manner, can, from their produce, admit of no doubt. It is notorious, that in the glass-works and other exciseable manufactures in Scotland, the revenue is so much defrauded as to give them an undue advantage over their fellow-subjects in England. This grievance, I am credibly informed, was represented to persons in power, and their answer was, they knew of it, but that if it was not permitted, the Scots could

* The gross produce is £. 43,254 more, the expence of collection.

† To do justice to the port of Glasgow, it is necessary to notice, that it is generally allowed the duties are more narrowly inspected, and fewer frauds committed there, notwithstanding its greater trade, than in any other port in Scotland.

not,

not, from several causes, carry on these works. The foundation of this opinion is much to be doubted; but supposing it true, works of all kinds ought to be carried on where a combination of favourable circumstances point out the places, as there only they can be of the most advantage to their country: therefore, if any, contrary to the conviction of their senses, will erect fabricks elsewhere, it is proper they should feel the consequences. Should any man take it into his head to erect works, for instance, for the manufacturing of soap, paper, or glass, on the summit of Cheviot Hills, or in the middle of any other wild, where the carriage to and from, and other unfavourable circumstances prevented their success; is government, on this account, to give up the excise, or a considerable part of it, that the fabrick may be continued? No, for by this means they might soon receive no excise at all, and yet have no further increase of manufactures than they otherwise would. Besides, though the manufacturers were ever so much favoured in the payment of the excise, we may be assured, that when any part of their manufactures are exported, the whole duty will be drawn back, though they have only paid a part of it.

As to the frauds of the customs, they are even more notorious than of the excise.

A few years since I heard it asserted by those who knew perfectly the trade of the place,
that

that in one port where the import of tobacco was very considerable, and great quantities sold inland and coastways, the exports (real and pretended) for the drawback were nearly equal to the whole of their imports. Thus did they procure that article almost duty-free, to the great diminution of the revenue, and detriment of the fair traders in England.

Not only in tobacco and this one port are similar measures practised, but in almost every other article, and all other ports, as is pretty generally known; and the small sum of £. 68,369, the whole produce of their customs, further evinces.

Was there any just cause for these exemptions, or were the Scots oppressed by any peculiar taxes, the ill execution of the revenue laws might be overlooked: But when we call to mind, that by the folly or inadvertency of our ancestors the Scotch were favoured in many excises, and almost exempted from the land-tax, being by the 9th article of the act of union, when the sum of £. 1,999,763. 8. 4½* shall be enacted to be raised by land-tax in England, to be only charged with the further sum of £. 48,000 as their quota, and proportionably for any greater or lesser sum.

Scotland, at the lowest calculation, is supposed to contain one million and a half of inhabitants, but we have seen pays scarce one-

* 4s. in the pound.

fiftieth part the taxes England does, though one-fourth * as populous. Thus, on an average, each individual in the latter kingdom pays the united government upwards of twelve times more than his fellow-subject in Scotland, the latter, by some mistake or peculiar indulgence, paying only pounds Scots† in lieu of sterling.—Is there a state in Europe, of its extent and population, half so little burthened with taxes? No, not one! Why then are not the revenue laws strictly executed, seeing justice and equity demand it?

If there should be any indulgence in these, it should be to the people of England, in return for the other peculiar taxes they bear: And if we may venture to risk a supposition, it is to these particular indulgences that the national animosity is not yet quite subdued: For were Cornwall or any other English county so favoured as our northern neighbours are, would not the rest of the nation look on that particular county with envy and hatred? A natural effect, and from a cause that had its weight in the most early ages—Instance, Joseph and his brethren.

If we can by any reformation save an amount, it is equivalent to the gaining it. This reflection leads us to consider the vast burthen

* The inhabitants of England are estimated to be six millions.

† The pound Scots is only 20d. the 12th part of a pound sterling.

of the poor-cess; an evil and a grievous tax that has long been complained of. Upon an average it cannot amount to less throughout the kingdom than fifteen-pence * in the pound of the full rent, which perhaps may be near equal to 3s. land-tax, considering the northern and other counties are not rated to the full, and the little that Scotland pays.—The real rental of the lands of Great Britain cannot well be less than 24 millions, and if the poor cess be equal to 15d. the amount of this tax will be one million and a half; now was there only a reformation of the poor-laws, and a system adopted similar to that in Holland, of finding employment suited to the strength and abilities of the different individuals of the poor, their labour, with the additional charge of half a million, might probably maintain them. Thus there would be an annual saving and national resource of one million, which is a tax equally grievous when raised for the purpose of maintaining the idle part of the poor, as if levied for the exigencies of the state. As the legislature had this salutary amendment in consideration last sessions of parliament, it is to be hoped they will in the course of this, devise and pass into a law some plan that may be productive of this great national saving.

* In many great towns it exceeds 2s.

S E C T I O N X.

CONSIDERATIONS *on* EAST INDIAN AFFAIRS.

*The improvement of our territorial possessions in Asia
—Measures conducive to the interest of Britain,
and happiness of her subjects in the Indies.*

THIS kingdom was very powerful, and of great weight in Europe, before she had any possessions in America, and may, we have endeavoured to point out, by pursuing proper measures, become or continue to be so without them, and even without the circuitous connection we now have with them, which, in all probability, at the worst events, we should still continue; as we find, by the channels of France, Holland, and Hamburg, the Americans have, notwithstanding they refused to take them direct from us, been largely supplied with British articles; as from this, and the demand in Russia and Turkey, occasioned by the peace between those powers, our manufacturers have not wanted employ. But whether this circuitous traffic cease or no, we may, in consequence of taking from other powers many articles that we encouraged only from America, procure a greater vend than we should otherwise have for our woollen, hardware, cotton, and other manufactures. That by these means, advantageous treaties of commerce might be entered into, there can be

no

no reason to doubt. However, whether America be reduced or no, there is one great source of power and riches that we ought not to neglect. Our territorial possessions in Asia might be rendered as valuable a branch of the empire as our American provinces can ever be. We will now enquire by what means.

We know that after the retreat of Cossim Ally Khan, and defeat of both him and Suja ul Dowla * by Lord Clive, that Shaw Allum (in Aug. 1765) granted to the East India Company the perpetual dewannee, or receipt of the revenue, of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa, at that period yielding annually above 200 lacks of rupees†.

At the same time an instrument was executed between the King ‡ and Nijam ul Dowla for a yearly tribute of 26 lacks, to be paid into the royal treasury for holding the subahship of these provinces, for the payment of which the Company became security; they had then only to stipulate with their nominal Subah§, Nijam ul Dowla, to take a certain

* Nabob of Oud, and Grand Vizier of the empire.

† A lack is 100,000 rupees, which at 2 s. 6 d. is £. 12,500; or at 2 s. 4 d. as sometimes computed, (the rupees of different places being different in value) is £. 11,666. 13. 4.

‡ The Great Mogul, Shaw Allum.

§ He had three months before, by the consent of the Company's servants, succeeded his father, Meer Jaffier, who after the defeat and death of Suraja ul Dowla had been raised to the Musnud by Lord Clive in the year 1757, but was deposed without any just reasons in the year 1760, to give place to his son-in-law, Cossim Ally Khan, and afterwards, on the deposition of Cossim Ally, restored in 1763 to the Subahship, which he held till his death, Jan. 7, 1765.

sum for his annual expences, which they fixed at 42 lacks. Thus the Company came to the acquisition of the immense revenue of 132 lacks of rupees, or £. 1,650,000 sterling; in consideration of which territorial revenue, the Company agreed to pay into the exchequer £. 400,000 annually, unless their dividends were below $12\frac{1}{2}$ per cent, and then to pay a proportionate sum until they should be reduced to 6 per cent*.

The ill use the Company's servants made of this power, very soon appeared, by the monopoly of salt, beetle-nut, and tobacco; articles the natives, through long custom, esteemed necessaries of life. The use they made of this monopoly was to obtain, by fixing an extravagant price, all the riches of the inhabitants; and of these they so effectually drained them, by foul means or fair, that they had not left where-withal to pay their taxes, which were exacted under the name of the Subah, with a rigorous hand.

But the most execrable deed of all, was the collecting the country rice into stores, and not importing from elsewhere in due time, thro' which means, aided by the short crop in 1769, they, the next year, by holding up the price above the abilities of the Gentoos to pur-

* The last payment of this was in 1772. In 1773 the Company, from the excess of their former dividends, and greatness of their debts, were necessitated to reduce their dividend to 6 per cent. and accept a loan from government of £. 1,400,000.

chase, brought on a famine that desolated Bengal, and filled the Ganges with dead—Calcutta presented to their eyes a scene of horror and distress that was scarcely to be parallel'd. To these we may add the many scenes of blood occasioned by the bribes received for deposing and creating Subahs, Nabobs, and Rajas.

The twelve judges lately sent out with ample salaries to set them above corruption, we may hope (from what they have already done*) will, in a great measure, remedy these abuses—Still it will not be complete. The national good requires more—*That all the territorial power and revenue be vested in the grand legislature of the empire*†—And by this the Company, as they now manage affairs, would be no great sufferers, seeing they would then be exempted from all future claim of the annual payment of £. 400,000, as well as from the expences of their military and great part of their civil establishment, and have, as equity requires it, to be reimbursed the expences of their fortifications, a sum upwards of three millions, besides other contingencies that may appear reasonable.

The revenue of Bengal, &c. from its coming into the Company's hands gradually decreased, and on the contrary, their expences,

* In the trials of Nuncomar, &c.

† On the expiration of the East India Company's charter in 1780.

civil and military, increased in the reverse proportion, so that in the course of the year 1770, the surplus of the revenue was dwindled away to 20 lacks (£. 250,000)—At this time too they had stopt 30 lacks out of the tribute to the Emperor, and allowance to the Subah, and shortly after, as an instance of the good faith to be reposed in the Company, they kept back the whole of the tribute from Shaw Alum, notwithstanding the payment of this was the condition under which they became perpetual dewans, or receivers of the revenue of those provinces.

On the supposition of government's taking into their hands the territorial jurisdiction and revenue of the British conquests in the east, some of the out-lines of Major Morrifon's plan seem to be almost unexceptionable, viz.

“(2.) * That the East India Company be “ confined to commerce alone.”

“(3.) That the revenue, the civil, political, and military departments be entirely “ under the controul of a Vice-Roy, and a “ Council of sixteen, to be appointed by the “ Crown, and *accountable to parliament for “ their conduct.*”

“(7.) That the Vice-Roy should have the “ whole executive power, but the revenue and “ every new deliberative measure to fall under

* These are the number of Major Morrifon's articles, of which in all there were 23—See his alliance with the Great Mogul, wherein it appears this worthy officer was ill-treated by the Company's servants.

“ the

“the confideration of the Vice-Roy and
“Council.”

“(16.) That every kind of security for per-
“fon and property should be proclaimed a-
“broad, and religiously observed (particular-
“ly with merchants from Persia, Tartary, and
“other distant countries).”

“(19.) That government pay the Company
“according to appraisement for all their forts,
“stores, and military apparatus, to be made
“good by yearly installments out of the re-
“venues.”*

To those out-lines we may add as an ex-
planation of the last selected article but one
—That trials by jury should be introduced
into the British territories in Hindostan, and
a code of laws as similar to the English as
may be, but less complicated, that the peo-
ple may be as little oppressed as possible by
the gentlemen of the long robe.

The consequences of these happy laws con-
trasted to anarchy, insecurity of property, and
personal oppression throughout all the East be-
side, would occasion such a conflux of people,
riches and power into the British provinces,
that the trade and revenues would, in all prob-
ability, increase three-fold.

* We suppose he means (*as he should*) that the East India
Company should be allowed not only the principal, but inter-
est, from the time of their quitting possession, on such parts
as remain unpaid, until the whole by yearly installments,
should be cleared off.

The provinces bordering on the mouth of the Indus, and the Gulphs of Sindi and Cambay, with the greater part of the Concan and Decan, we might, on the easy condition of assisting to reinstate him on his throne*, be invested with by the Great Mogul; and those ceded provinces might easily be wrested from under the arbitrary yoke of their usurpers, to bless the inhabitants with the mild and happy government we have premised to be established in Bengal, Behar and Orissa.

Thus would the cause of Great Britain become the cause of mankind, and we should differ from other conquerors, in that we conquered not for ourselves only, but for the good of the human race. Then would the native tyrants of the East be obliged to change their conduct, or soon have only desolated regions to reign over, for their subjects would fly from the hand of oppression to that asylum, where personal freedom and private property extended their arms to receive them.

And thus would our dominions contain the most fertile provinces of Hindostan, extend from the Ganges to the Indus, and command the extensive trade of those great rivers, by means of which we might, in the northern

* He has long been wandering from one Subah or Chief to another, who alternately fleece the people in his name. It would be the interest of this country to reinstate him, as he would, by uniting the now-divided northern parts of the empire, become a barrier against the incursions of the northern powers.

provinces of the Mogul's empire, in Persia, and the southern parts of Tartary, soon vend more British manufactures than all America takes from us; and perhaps this Indian territory may give as great employment to our shipping, as our American continental Colonies, were the trade left open to all subjects resident in Britain, and not confined to particular associations of men by exclusive charters—How far the East India Company's exclusive trade to China, and other places subject to other powers, may, or may not be beneficial to this kingdom, we shall not at present contend; but surely *it never can be the interest of any state, to grant to a particular society the sole trade between any two parts of its own dominions.*

From the pacific disposition of the Gentoos, and most of the other tribes, and the contrast between the British government and that of the neighbouring powers, the people, though immensely numerous, would without restraint remain in allegiance to the imperial state. But even should they, from any unforeseen events, wish to become independent, they will not easily effect it, because from the mildness of the climate, their general effeminacy, and other prevailing causes, the southern Asiatics, though ever so well versed in arms, can never stand before Europeans, as the experience of all ages has told us; even the descendants of Europeans lose the military virtue and prowess of their ancestors. We need only instance the descendants of those Portuguese who conquer-

ed the East—They proved as unable to resist the Dutch, though equally skilful in arms, as the Asiatics were to withstand the prowess of the ancestors of those now conquered in their turn.

Thus should there ever be a general defection in the East, which we have no reason ever to expect, we may with some propriety suppose, that a less army than we now have in America, to bring our Colonies there to their due allegiance, would in the East bring about that effect.

The principal danger of losing our eastern dominions would arise from some popular Vice-Roy wishing to render himself independent.

To prevent this as much as possible, we should, though even irritated by the neighbouring powers, and necessitated to humble them, avoid the rage of conquest, and too great extension of dominion, for by reducing to our government the rivals of our eastern empire, who through jealousy would be the imperial state's allies in time of need, we should, in case of revolt, have their whole accumulated force against us.

A farther prevention would be to divide our Indian territory into two or more governments, and to delegate the power of the Vice-Roys for short periods only, not exceeding three or four years, and to persons of the first rank and property in the imperial state, who could have no inducement to wish to remain always absent from their native-country. One half
of

of the Council might likewise be changed on each new appointment of a Vice-Roy, that power might not remain too long in the hands of any. Thus too, there would always remain people versed in the government, and excepting the first remove, each appointment of Counsellors would hold their office for six or eight years, or during the reigns of two Vice-Roys.

From Bengal, Behar, Orissa, and the provinces that would be ceded, we may at first draw a revenue of three millions sterling, which in a few years, from the accession of inhabitants by the proposed lenient government, would greatly increase.

The revenues of the East arise partly from customs or duties on the import, export, and transit of articles of trade, but chiefly from the rents of lands, which last, if the rents are within due bounds or not raised by monopoly, is the least oppressive to the subject of any, because it is no advantage to the farmer to pay his rent to an individual rather than to government; but, on the contrary, if the latter mode exempt him and his fellow-subject from taxes, the people at large are so far benefited. All that can be said against this mode prevailing in Europe is, that wanting the intermediate power of the landed interest, the sovereign would be without due controul, and the people would have no law but his will.

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In India immutable justice requires, that the imperial state should exercise no more power than she ought to do in other quarters of the globe; that is, that she only enjoy their foreign navigation, the regulation of their commerce, and consequent power of external duties, but not the right of internal taxes. From whence then the reader may say shall our revenues arise? From the rents of lands. But were the regulation of the rents entirely at the disposal of government to raise them as they chose, there would be no encouragement to industry; the people might be oppressed, and the empire ruined.

What we would propose, is a system that would even admit of a powerful landed interest, and raise a revenue sufficient.

The way the lands in Hindostan are commonly let by the sub-farmers of the Nabobs and Rajas, is to receive half its produce. A high rent, even in England, if much labour is spent in the culture.

Bengal, &c. with the provinces supposed to be ceded, contain more than a square of ten degrees in latitude, and as many in longitude; then computing a degree square, in the parallel * of 30° , to contain 4000 † square English

* The middle latitude of our Indian possessions is about 30° north, and in this latitude a degree of longitude is 52 geographic or 59.94 English miles.—A degree of lat. 60° is 69 miles 288 yards = 69.16; therefore $(59.94 \times 69.16) 4145$ square English miles are a square degree in the aforesaid parallel.

† A square mile contains 640 acres.

miles, or 2,560,000 acres, the whole will be two hundred and fifty-six millions of acres. Now a quit rent of 1 s. per acre on the whole would produce upwards of twelve million pounds; but as mountains, deserts, rivers, and highways, must occupy a considerable portion of the space, and even great quantities of land capable of culture must have hitherto remained uncultivated, we will not calculate more than a hundred millions of acres likely for some time to be taken up on quit-rent, which, if in the course of a few years it could be made to average 2 s. * per acre, would yield, without any burthen to the people, ten millions sterling.

As to the mode of letting, I conceive the following plan would be as little oppressive, or liable to objection, as almost any other, viz. that tracts of land, not less than about 50 acres,

* It may be said, why were not the quit-rents in America 2 s. instead of from $\frac{1}{2}$ d. to $1\frac{1}{2}$ d. per acre?—The plain reason is, *land is only valuable in proportion to the number of its inhabitants, and those in its vicinity*; therefore, as the number now in America bear a small proportion to the ground that will admit of culture, it continues necessary to offer new lands almost for the taking up, that the encouragement may be sufficient to invite settlers from distant countries. In Bengal, &c. the case is different; the country is already populous; there is no private property in lands, and great part of these, from being cultivated, are valuable; and being surrounded by populous nations, there is no doubt but by holding forth a mild government, new settlers will come in to take the lands on the terms prescribed.

nor exceeding 200 by computation,* should be put up by auction, and let to the highest bidder, on leases for seven years, but conditionally to be leases for ever, if on survey the rents be found to equal or exceed the sum of two rupees per acre. Thus, after the first seven years, there would be every year a general lease of lands that had been taken up seven years preceding, excepting those that were then at or above two rupees; and all the lands would regularly rise, till in the end, as the country increased in population, the whole of them that would admit of improvement would be at two rupees per acre quit-rent to the imperial state, and would even then admit of a considerable interest to the proprietor, as two rupees per acre must fall far short of half the produce, the general rent of land in Hindostan and many other parts of the world†.

The inhabitants of Bengal, before the famine, were estimated at twelve millions, and by that sad catastrophe were supposed to be reduced near one-fourth; however, with the increase since then, they, with the inhabitants of the other provinces, cannot be less

* Small spaces for building should be given gratis, or for a trivial acknowledgement, to be held in perpetuity—Houses, though not lands (with some few exceptions) were permanent possessions, even in the time of the native princes.

† In Madeira and many other places, where a mode somewhat similar is followed, the proprietor, as soon as the grapes are gathered and the wine is made, receives for his rent one-half of the latter.

than

than fifteen millions*, or twice the inhabitants of Great Britain†, so as the inhabitants of Britain, besides other heavy taxes, are supposed to pay in rents of lands, twenty-four millions—twice the number in the East Indies, a country more abounding in riches, and as much in industry, might certainly pay with ease ten millions, the sum supposed to be raised, were the preferable lands to average 2s. per acre—And as, from the new form of the constitution, and the opportunity afforded to rich men of vesting their fortunes in permanent possessions, instead of now keeping great part of their riches buried in the earth, or in jewels, the population of the British Indian empire might be doubled in a few periods of seven years, it does not seem improbable that the whole of the hundred millions might, including the rents of the inferior lands, produce two rupees per acre, which, valuing the rupee as usual at 2s. 6d. will produce twenty-five millions sterling, a great sum; but not much for thirty millions of people, especially as it falls on the land, and can be no impediment to trade and industry—One-fifth of this revenue we will suppose must be spent in the country, to maintain the civil and military establishments: thus four-fifths will remain to be drawn

* From the most probable accounts the number of inhabitants must be several millions more.

† England six millions, and Scotland one million and a half.

out, and this we shall be enabled to do by the vast industry of the inhabitants manufacturing and raising more than they can consume, over and above paying the amount of their imports, the balance of which they receive in silver, not only from the European, but many Indian powers. We therefore might receive our revenue in our Indian imports, and the silver that Holland, France, &c. would otherwise have to export, the trouble and risque of which would be saved to them, by exchanging it for government's bills on the treasury of Bengal, &c.

There is one vulgar error militates with the idea of drawing a foreign revenue, and which we must endeavour to obviate, because some men of sense have adopted it. It is, that although a country may bear to pay heavy taxes, when these taxes are spent among themselves, it cannot bear even a much smaller taxation when the produce of it is to be withdrawn and spent in another state. This argument has its weight in a country so circumstanced as not to have foreign demand for its surplus; but when on the contrary, as is the case with the East Indies and with *America*, the produce of its lands and of the industry of its inhabitants, are eagerly sought after by other countries, the argument can have no force. For were the taxes of any country, say four or five millions, entirely spent at home, it must be ultimately in the produce
of

S E C T I O N X. 123

of the land and manufactures *, therefore so much the less must be exported; and would it not be the same if these articles so consumed at home, to the amount of four or five millions, were sold to foreigners, and the produce sent to the governing power to expend where it might?

By what other means do the distant countries remit their taxes and rents to the capital where they are principally consumed, but by selling the excess above what they use themselves of their own produce and manufactures? It must, however, be owned, that a revenue spent where it is raised is so far of advantage, as that a home consumption, when complete, affords a better price, particularly in such articles of the produce of the land as require, when not immediately consumed, any preparation to keep them from decay.

The use to be made of this vast Indian revenue, as well as *all those* which may be drawn *from any other dependent states*, should be in the determination of the whole legislative body, and granted by the Commons as the other supplies (except those mortgaged for the interest of the national debt) now are,

* Part of both may, in many instances, be foreign, (particularly in Holland, and other small populous states) and in this case, it is evidently the same whether the expenders of the taxes consume these articles at home or abroad, as an equivalent in either instance must be sent out of the country to purchase them.

for one year only.—By these means, if bribery and corruption did not prevent it, in a short time the debt of the nation might be cleared off, and the imperial state exempted, except in cases of necessity, from all taxes whatever ; some few external duties necessary for the regulation of trade excepted.

The consequence of this great influx of money, supposing the *import and export of provisions were free*, could not enhance the price of these, or of wages, above the par of the neighbouring nations ; but, if by these means we were exempted from taxes, would lower the rates so far that manufactures of all kinds would be cheaper in Britain, though overflowing with riches, than in any part of Europe besides ; consequently there would arise the greater demand for them, and employment for the greater number of inhabitants, who no sooner would be wanted than obtained ; for who would not come to a country where liberty was enjoyed and no taxes paid ; and what nation would dare to insult a state that had every resource within itself, and could carry on the most expensive war without feeling its weight ?

This happy period, those halcyon days, may by some be deemed never to exist but in the ideas of their projector, because, say they, the corruption of human nature is such, that the ministers, aided with the great external revenue, will lessen very little of our own internal

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nal burthens, but apply the more to purposes of venality, and when they see fit, entirely overturn the constitution: Besides, they may further urge, that even were the representatives of the *people*, at such time as the Indian revenue should answer all the exigencies of the state, to take sufficient care to exempt *them* from all taxes, but those necessary to regulate their commerce, the minister would have no occasion to be beholden to the people for the annual supplies, and that the grant of the commons for its application would be but a farce. But if from the disposition of the people, this grant should even be found necessary, the minister would still have a sufficient fund of corruption to ensure compliance.

The weight of these objections must be acknowledged, and are indeed very powerful, but still not insurmountable, were the rotten boroughs struck out of the constitution, the effects of bribery rendered uncertain, and the power of the Commons delegated for shorter periods.

All these might be effected by an easy change, an alteration no way complicated, by ordaining, that the representatives of all boroughs whose voters do not exceed one thousand * be elected by the county at large: That the votes for the election of representatives, and on any disputed question in the

* Or any other definite number that may be found advisable.

house (when required by two or more members) should be decided by ballot; and that the Commons should be chosen only for one of their former periods, triennial or annual.

These alterations would be no absolute change of the constitution, and would not lessen the power of any minister to forward the interest of his country.

How happy would be that King who should thus consult the good of his people! How revered would be his name to the latest posterity! And how glorious would be that Minister who should promote these virtuous ends!

7 AP 53

F I N I S.

AP.

A P P E N D I X.

O N

The M E A N S of
EMANCIPATING SLAVES,
W I T H O U T L O S S
T O T H E I R
P R O P R I E T O R S.

I N S C R I B E D

To the H O L D E R S of
P L A N T A T I O N S
I N T H E
W E S T I N D I E S

A N D

Continent of America.



A P P E N D I X.

On the Manumission of Slaves.

AS we have, in one of the preceding Sections, inveighed against the Americans for keeping their fellow-creatures in *perpetual slavery*, it becomes incumbent on us to point out some probable means whereby the servitude of the negroes may, like that of other men, be only for a short time, and they in the end be free.

The chief and evident cause that militates against their liberation is, the unwillingness of men in general to give up any property or power they have attained: and to this we may add another, which prevents many persons, even of humanity, from emancipating slaves, who perhaps have rendered them particular services; it is, that the laws of the different Colonies require, that whoever frees his slave shall give security in a considerable sum (which in Pennsylvania is £. 30 currency) that the person freed shall never become chargeable to the public.

This law might be necessary to prevent men of fordid dispositions from liberating their slaves at a time when they became no longer

serviceable, when worn out by fatigue, and debilitated by age, their maintenance would become a charge to their proprietor. But then why should they, whose generous spirit induce them to give their slaves freedom in the prime of life, be liable to any support they may require in their old age, when the public has reaped the benefit of their labours, and their proportion of taxes, as much as of any other subjects, though different in colour? It might with equal reason be expected that every master should be liable to the maintenance of his apprentice, should he ever become chargeable to the public.

To obviate this bar to manumission, the author * we have once before mentioned has laid down a plan, wherein he makes it appear that the sum of 10s. (Pennsylvania currency) paid (to a chamber appointed, or to the overseers of the parish) for each year the age of the slave liberated exceeds 21, will sufficiently indemnify the public. This sum, accounting the exchange 150, will be 6s. 8d. sterling.

In this estimate he supposes the negroes not in general to become chargeable till they attain the age of 60 years.

Now that a payment to a certain chamber of 6s. 8d. sterling for every year the liberated negroe's age exceeds 21, will, with the accumulation of interest, be sufficient in a general

* An Essay on the Expediency of the Abolition of Slavery, published in Burlington, New Jersey, 1773.

practice to maintain the whole that may become chargeable, we can have no doubt of; but as the propriety of this payment being thus regulated, carries no mathematical conviction with it, but on the contrary would be too great a payment at the middle ages, and too little at the extremes, we shall lay before our readers a method not liable to these objections, and at the same time shall go upon some data of this author's.

He observes that in Pennsylvania, if any liberated negro become chargeable, his late proprietor or security is called upon for £. 30 currency, and if the charge exceed that sum, it is born by the province, or in fact arises out of the surplus of these sums, beyond the maintenance required for a great part of the negroes that have become chargeable: so that on experience it is found this sum of £. 30 currency, or £. 20 sterling (accounting the exchange at 150) paid on each negro becoming chargeable, is equal to the average charge of the whole. This being allowed it plainly follows, that the sum which should be paid on the liberation of a negro of any given age on a supposition, there was a certainty of his attaining the period of becoming chargeable, (before estimated to be at the age of 60 years) is such an amount as would be equal to the receipt or payment of £. 20, at such distance of time as his age falls short of 60 years. But as the event of his attaining this

period, in which case only the money is to be paid, is uncertain: it is evident the sum that ought to be paid must be compounded of these two events, that is, it must be so much less in proportion to the uncertainty of the party's attaining the age of 60.

Upon these principles the following table is calculated:

The probabilities of life in the West Indies, and the southern of our American Colonies, the former particularly, cannot be greater than they are in London; therefore we have taken them from one of the tables in the Appendix to Doctor Price's Observations on reverfionary payments.

The fourth column, or probability of being living at the age of 60 years, arises out of the preceding one, that is, as 147 out of the different numbers alive at the preceding ages, are living at the age of 60 years, 147 becomes the general numerator to each of these different numbers, which, used as denominators, give the probability a person of such given age has of attaining or living beyond his sixtieth year: the other columns need no further explanation than we have already given; but, as the sums to be paid on liberation, in the lower and middle periods of life, appear very low, although the rate of interest we have supposed these to accumulate at is sufficiently low to obviate any objection to its being compound, which the nature of calculations

culations for distant periods absolutely require, this lowness will perhaps appear to be owing to our estimating the probability of life no higher than in London, which, however, we cannot help again observing, is certainly equal or superior to that of the negroes in our plantations abroad.

To shew those who may differ from us in this opinion, that the sums at these periods would not have been greatly more had we even calculated according to the probabilities of life at Breslau, or followed Mr. de Moivre's hypothesis, we have given by way of note what sums, according to these, would be required for the ages of 21, 35, and 50.

According to the probabilities of life at Breslau *.

21	39	592	*4088	*2166	*0885	1	15	4
35	25	490	*4939	*3751	*1851	3	14	—
50	10	346	*6965	*6755	*4704	9	8	2
60	—	242	—	—	—	—	—	—

According to De Moivre's hypothesis.

21	39	65	*4000	*2166	*0866	1	14	7
35	25	51	*5098	*3751	*1912	3	16	6
50	10	36	*7222	*6755	*4878	9	15	1
60	—	26	—	—	—	—	—	—

* For the titles of the above columns, see those corresponding in the next page.

Age of the slave to be liberated.	Complement of his age, or No. of years short of 60.	Persons living at different ages, according to probabilities of life in London.	Probability of being living at the age of 60 years.	Present value of £.1 to be paid on the expiration of the complement of any given life from 60, discontinuing at the rate of £.4 per cent. compound interest.	Value of £.1 to be paid conditionally on the attaining the full age of 60 years.	Value of £.20 to be paid on the same conditions.
21	39	487	.3018	.2166	.0652	1 6 1
22	38	479	.3068	.2253	.0691	1 7 7
23	37	471	.3121	.2343	.0731	1 9 3
24	36	463	.3175	.2436	.0773	1 10 10
25	35	455	.3231	.2534	.0818	1 12 8
26	34	447	.3311	.2635	.0872	1 14 10
27	33	439	.3348	.2741	.0917	1 16 8
28	32	431	.3410	.2850	.0971	1 18 10
29	31	422	.3516	.2964	.1042	2 1 8
30	30	413	.3559	.3083	.1097	2 3 10
31	29	404	.3638	.3206	.1166	2 6 7
32	28	395	.3721	.3335	.1241	2 9 7
33	27	386	.3808	.3462	.1318	2 12 8
34	26	377	.3899	.3607	.1406	2 16 3
35	25	368	.3994	.3751	.1498	2 19 11
36	24	359	.4094	.3901	.1597	3 3 10
37	23	350	.4200	.4057	.1703	3 8 1
38	22	341	.4310	.4219	.1818	3 12 8
39	21	332	.4427	.4388	.1942	3 17 8
40	20	322	.4568	.4564	.2084	4 3 4
41	19	312	.4711	.4746	.2236	4 9 5
42	18	302	.4867	.4936	.2402	4 16 1
43	17	292	.5034	.5134	.2584	5 3 4
44	16	282	.5212	.5339	.2782	5 11 3
45	15	272	.5404	.5552	.3000	6 — —
46	14	262	.5610	.5775	.3240	6 9 7
47	13	252	.5833	.6006	.3503	7 — 1
48	12	242	.6074	.6246	.3793	7 11 8
49	11	233	.6309	.6496	.4098	8 3 11
50	10	224	.6562	.6755	.4432	8 17 3
51	9	215	.6858	.7026	.4806	9 4 3
52	8	206	.7135	.7307	.5213	10 8 6
53	7	198	.7424	.7599	.5641	11 5 7
54	6	190	.7736	.7903	.6113	12 4 6
55	5	183	.8032	.8219	.6601	13 4 —
56	4	176	.8352	.8548	.7139	14 5 6
57	3	169	.8698	.8890	.7732	15 19 3
58	2	162	.9074	.9245	.8388	16 15 6
59	1	155	.9483	.9615	.9117	18 4 8
60	—	147	1	1	1	20 — —

What we would now wish to propose is, that the government of each island or province should take upon them the future maintenance that may be necessary for every slave, free of bodily infirmities, hereafter to be liberated, on condition of there being paid into their treasury, such sums as ought to be according to their respective ages. As to the age of the party, where it can, it ought to be proved indubitably; but where it cannot, to be then determined by skilful persons appointed by a magistrate, who, from what evidence they could gather, and from appearances, might fix it to the best of their judgment.

However, until such time as the emancipated negroes fall further under the consideration of the respective governments, it is easy for individuals who make them free, or afford them the means of doing it, to take such equivalent into their own hands, and in consequence engage to maintain them when they can no longer do it by their own labour; that is, to take them again into their own plantations as soon as they require it, and there maintain them, reaping the benefit of such little employment as they are capable of—All this being premised, it will be easy to form a plan of emancipation that shall be fraught with no detriment to the proprietors of slaves.

If I am informed right, it is a custom in some of the Spanish settlements, that whenever a cargo of slaves arrives, the price each
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individual sells at is registered in one of their courts, and his purchaser is obliged to allow him (or her) one day for himself out of the six allotted for labour, by which they secure to him the means of becoming free; for when, by making proper use of this day, he acquires what is equal to one-fifth of his purchase, his master is obliged to sell him one day out of the remaining five; then the slave being master of two days, with the same liberty of purchasing the others one by one, has it in his power to make a rapid progress in becoming free.

Shall the English, ever famed for courage and humanity which always go hand in hand, be out done in the latter by a nation in many instances notorious for cruelty?

Let not they who boast of their own freedom, and should entertain elevated notions of liberty, be greater tyrants and oppressors of their fellow-creatures than the subjects of a despotic monarch are.

This mode of emancipation, I am sensible, will meet with opposition from all those, who, insensible of the rights of human nature any further than relates to themselves, are wont to look upon their negroes as indisputably their property as their horses or dogs, because, they will say, although in the end the negro pays us the whole of his purchase money, from whence is his ability of doing it derived, but from our previously giving up our right to one day in the six; therefore, we in fact
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liberate him without any real consideration, because, had we retained the labour of that day to our own use, we should not only have been in possession of the money paid us for his freedom, or of his labour which was equivalent, as it acquired it, but likewise have been entitled to all his future service. This mode of argument is plausible enough, did we not consider that a man working for himself, conscious the produce of his labour is his own, and to be applied to effectuate what the human mind, if not broken with slavery and despair, must ardently desire—his liberty and a prospect of future competence, will be inclined to exert himself to a much greater degree, than if an intolerant task-master was to reap the whole fruits of his labour; not only so, but these hopes of better days, would, in all probability, so invigorate and add life and spirit to him, that when labouring for his master, he would do more, or if task-work execute it better than he otherwise would have done.

However, the plan of liberation we have to propose, is without those objections; it is, that every proprietor should encourage his negro to save money, which may be done by various means—by paying him proportionately for working above his task-work—by allowing him, where land is plentiful, to cultivate at his leisure hours, a spot of ground for himself, and by purchasing the produce of him at

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its full value, if no other market be near—likewise by other means that particular situations and circumstances may point out:—And when the negro has acquired what is equal to one-sixth part of his value or cost, to sell him one-sixth of his time, that is, one day in the week—Then by the same encouragement and paying him for the free day the usual hire, or allowing him to work elsewhere, he will, in due time, be enabled to purchase another—He will now, besides his leisure hours, be master of two days, and may, therefore, in little more than half the time, purchase a third.

We will stop here, and take time to observe, that as the possibility of a slave's acquiring wherewith to purchase the first day is only derived from his leisure hours, it would be nothing more than humanity dictates to sell him a lesser portion, that is, on the payment of a twenty-fourth of his value, to allow him one day in the month, or four weeks, which he may make use of, as we have before provided, to enable him by three other such payments and purchases to acquire the more speedily the property of one day in the week, with which, to proceed as we have mentioned, to the acquiring of other two days. Now his proprietor being only master of half his time, it will not be amiss, as he is obliged by the laws to give security for the maintenance of his slave liberated, should he ever become charge-

chargeable, that he secure himself from that burthen, by retaining * one day as security for that purpose, by making the remaining half-purchase of the slave chargeable, in equal payments for the liberty of the two next days; these payments made, nothing in justice or reason should retard the negro being wholly free, but the payment to his late proprietor (who now becomes his bondsman to the public) of an equivalent to the probability of his becoming a charge in his old age. This equivalent ought to be paid in hand, but should the freed man take a very considerable time, it can be no loss to the bondsman, as the retention of one day's labour in the week will (except in very advanced ages) be equal or superior to the interest and risk of not being paid, and we may suppose a sufficient spur to the negro, to procure and pay the sum wanted.

After slaves, male or female, by their own industry have thus emancipated themselves, their children or near connections may possibly

* This day might be equally retained by allowing the negro to purchase the remaining three days as he did the other, viz. by paying only one-sixth of his value for each; but then as the absolute freedom of the last day could not be had without the payment likewise of the equivalent, to the prospect of his future maintenance, which in slaves of advanced ages would be so considerable, that joined to one-sixth of their value to be previously paid, such negro might think it much more than one day of the week was worth, and consequently content himself with paying his master five-sixths of his value, to purchase five days in the six, and so leave him liable, and without due recompence, to maintain him in his old age.

yet remain in slavery—The liberty of these they should be allowed to purchase in the same manner as they have done their own: justice requires it, and humanity will permit no man to refuse selling the children to their father. As to the value to be fixed upon individuals of different ages and degrees of utility, there is no prescribing any general rule: this will lay in the breast of the proprietor; and as no person will adopt this scheme without some degree of humanity, or of justice, we may hope the same feelings will direct him to estimate with equity.

It may be said that no plantation can be carried on with regularity, without an equal number of hands to labour on every working day in the week, which cannot be, when the slaves have purchased the freedom of certain days; however, this we presume can produce no such inconvenience, as without labour, the slaves can have procured no liberty at all, nor can procure any further; and where can they labour to more advantage than in the plantation they reside on: so that all the difference is, they must be paid or allowed on those days, the usual wages of the country, which is no hardship to the master, as he has received an equivalent in value to this day, and may be easily determined, as there are in every island and province some free negroes who work for hire; and in the islands particularly, many slaves belonging to proprietors who have no
 planta-

plantations, but let their negroes out to labour for others.

It may be as well not to make the first weekly day of liberation for every one the same; but if with one part the Monday should be begun with, to proceed regularly forward; the other part might begin at and proceed from Thursday: thus when twenty slaves in two parties had each procured the freedom of three days, the want of their labour would be precisely the same as that of ten slaves made perfectly free: and the sum they will have paid, will be equal to the whole value or cost of ten such negroes; therefore, their proprietor has it in his power to purchase ten more, and with this advantage, that without any increase of capital he is enabled to have ten more negroes upon his plantation, and consequently an increase of produce in that proportion: for this accession of produce he will have undoubtedly labourers' wages to pay; but then these wages will not be near equal to the advantage gained, for in the other instances no one would hire men, but with the design of gaining by their labour.

It now becomes matter of enquiry, whether it would not be better, where both are equally to be had, to hire freemen or to labour with slaves. To the man of small capital the former choice is obvious, because, with only as much as will pay wages till the getting in of his first crop, he may cultivate his lands
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to as great an extent as those who have many times his capital, and though his gains will not be so great as those that have no labour to pay, they will be much greater on the capital employed; and this is certainly the criterion to go by.

Now, as to the man of large capital, we may venture to say, he will not value an annuity on the life of any new slave at eight years purchase, equal to legal interest for his money: therefore, as good slaves, on an average, are worth £. 50 * sterling per head, and good mechanics are, many of them, bought and sold as high as £. 100, it would be equally his interest to hire the former at £. 6 . 5, yearly wages, with all necessary cloathing and provisions, and the latter at £. 12 . 10, with the same allowances, as to purchase them.

It would even be better, because the planter would be under no engagement to maintain the hired men in their old age. These wages and other attendants, are, in reality, as much, or more, than are usually paid in many parts of England for farmers' servants and country mechanics. And is there no difference between the labour of a freeman and a slave? Yes, reason tells us there must be: The one

* Slaves from some part of the coast (where they are of less value) may be bought on importation at so low as about £. 36 per head, provided men and women, with a considerable proportion of boys and girls of 12 years of age and upwards, be taken together as they run, with a right only of refusal of one in fifteen or twenty.

is stimulated by the consciousness of greater gain—the other has no such motive; for let his labour be more or less it matters not to him, he is not interested in his master's welfare.

To spur the slave on to activity, custom has appointed, in all labours that will admit of it, a certain task for a day's work: This work, because it must, will in some manner be done; but then with a degree of languor and listlessness whether it be ill or well executed, and not with that spirit and ease, or to such extent, that a freeman, certain of reaping an increased pay proportionate to his industry, would do.

Men, conscious of being free, will, even for moderate wages, engage themselves in labours that appear the most intolerable to slaves; for what is worse than working in lead, coal, or tin-mines? And we may boldly assert, that it is more the interest of the employers of these men to pay them in proportion to their industry*, than to purchase them (if it was in their power) at £. 50 or £. 60 per head, the price of seasoned slaves, and to find them with provisions and cloaths.

From these premises it will follow, that *state policy*, which requires labour to be low, is not repugnant to the emancipation of slaves; but, on the contrary, is interested in it, and particularly so, if by their own industry they have reimbursed their value; for then *they must*

* By the measure or quantity of their work.

either be looked on as an accession of so many subjects, or as the means of such a national acquisition of property as they have paid for their emancipation: which increase of capital in proper hands, in a commercial nation, will always be turned to its advantage.

Had the labour of the negroes in our islands been voluntary, we never should have heard of their frequent insurrections and murder of their masters—nor of these bloody wars at different times, for near a century past, with the runaway negroes in Jamaica, whom at last we have been obliged to acknowledge independent.

We do not mean to infer that proprietors of slaves should free them without recompence, because this act of generosity, to the diminution of their own fortunes, can with no more reason be expected of them than that other individuals should apply their private property to the same purpose—to the reimbursement of the sums they cost their proprietors.

What we wish to have adopted is, to look on the cost or value of a negro as a debt due from him, for which we retain his labour as security for principal and interest, and to put the payment of it as much as possible in his power by permitting him to pay it off as he is able, and gradually redeem his own; which is no more indulgence than we would readily allow any other debtor. Should we not think

think that creditor a cruel one, who having received from a poor man, his debtor, an assignment of six horses, being all the effects he was worth, as security and interest for the debt from their value and labour, should refuse the redemption of the horses one by one; but, because he knew he had an advantageous bargain, should insist upon the poor man's redeeming them altogether, if at all: an event never likely to be in his power; although, had he been suffered to redeem them one by one, he would soon, by the profit gradually accruing and accumulating from their additional labour, have effectuated the redemption of the whole.

This creditor we should think cruel, and yet that man, if such there be, would be more so, who should refuse his slave the purchasing the six weekly days of labour one by one.

Men thus made free, would have in them the spirit of industry, and, as we have before concluded, would voluntarily labour for as much more than meat and necessaries, as the life annuity of their value and prospect of future maintenance would be worth, exclusive of the additional labour, which, as free men interested in it, they would give.

These wages, though equally advantageous to the employer to give, as to purchase the labourer, would enable the latter to live in a degree of enjoyment of wants, real or imagi-

nary, so much superior to a slave, as would stimulate this class, to attain the condition of freemen.

Were great part of our negro labourers free, and a probability, or the means afforded to all of becoming so, we should have nothing to fear from insurrections: But should we still continue the system of keeping our fellow-creatures in *perpetual slavery*, what have we not to expect from that justly enraged part of our species?

In Jamaica, St. Domingo, and Dutch Guiana these oppressed men have vindicated the rights of nature—in despite of their tyrants have become free, and formed republics so formidable, that their former masters were glad to acknowledge their independency, on condition to be freed from their inroads and depredations, and that they receive into their community no others of their sable race, but deliver them to their masters.

Without a new mode of conduct, we shall certainly some day see as powerful an insurrection, and as formidable a colony of negroes, in the fastnesses of the Apalachian Mountains, as now is in Guiana, St. Domingo, or the Blue Mountains of Jamaica.

As the negroes in Virginia, the Carolinas and Georgia exceed the whites so far in numbers, nothing hitherto has prevented this event but the great antipathy the Indians bear this unfortunate race, and the better
treat-

treatment of the negroes as to food, from the greater plenty of it, which lessens their incitement to rise.

However, this antipathy of the Indians, which is the chief barrier to insurrections, may cease ; but whether it do or no, it will shortly be of little moment, as these aboriginal Americans, since the introduction of European vices, have been, and still are, greatly on the decrease ; while, on the contrary, the negroes, even by their natural increase *, are becoming more and more numerous, and probably after these troubles are subsided, will be increased still further by importations. Therefore should we continue to keep nearly the whole race as slaves, and not encourage and assist them to liberate themselves, the epocha of their universal freedom, and ruin of their present masters, may be at no very distant period.

* This increase would be still greater, did not the inhumanity of some of their masters allow no remission of labour to the females, during the latter part of their pregnancy.

ERRATA.

Page 6 l. 20 and 21 It is plain it cannot, *read* it is plain cannot.

- 8 31 manufactures, *read* manufacturers.
- 21 24 colonists, *read* the colonists. Line 39, *dele* be.
- 26 16 land, *read* 'land (*abbreviation of Newfoundland*)
- 29 24 foward, *read* forward. Page 39, line 19 until, *read* untill.
- 43 23 cavil about the right, *read* dispute the right. *And in the following line, immediately after do so, read* They then came into non-importation agreements, as they had done before for the repeal of the stamp-act, and such now was the leniency or want of firmness in the government, that the same causes produced the same effect, and the act, except in the article of tea, on which was laid a duty of 3d. per lb. was repealed.

The last line of the same page, preamble to the fore-mentioned act sets forth, read preambles to the fore-mentioned act, and the 4 G. III. chap. 15. (laying a duty on foreign sugars, indigo, coffee, wines, &c. &c.) set forth.

- 61 28 thing, *read* think.
- 72 19 if the former, *read* if the produce of the colonies.
- 79 24 little chance, *read* little chance of
- 84 8 even, *read* ever.
- 102 22 not much to be, *read* not to be.
- 110 9 were not below, *read* were below.
- 121 18 *dele* the.
- 134 Title of the 5th column, discontinuing, *read* discounting.

 The Reader is desired particularly to attend to the Errata in
P. 43.

7 AP 55

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